Stranger Dictum: Why \u3ci\u3eArizona v. Gant\u3c/i\u3e Compels the Conclusion that Suspicionless \u3ci\u3eBuie\u3c/i\u3e Searches Incident to Lawful Arrests are Unconstitutional by Miller, Colin
University of South Carolina
Scholar Commons
Faculty Publications Law School
2010
Stranger Dictum: Why Arizona v. Gant Compels
the Conclusion that Suspicionless Buie Searches
Incident to Lawful Arrests are Unconstitutional
Colin Miller
University of South Carolina - Columbia, mille933@law.sc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/law_facpub
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you by the Law School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized
administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Colin Miller, Stranger Dictum: Why Arizona v. Gant Compels the Conclusion that Suspicionless Buie Searches Incident to Lawful Arrests are
Unconstitutional, 62 Baylor L. Rev. 1 (2010).
STRANGER THAN DICTUM: WHY ARIZONA V. GANT COMPELS THE
CONCLUSION THAT SUSPICIONLESS BUIE SEARCHES INCIDENT TO
LAWFUL ARRESTS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Colin Miller*
I. Introduction ..................................... 2
II. The Creation and Development of the Search Incident to a
Lawful Arrest ............. 5........ ........... 5
A. Weeks, Carroll, and the Creation of the Search
Incident to a Lawful Arrest Exception in Dicta .............. 5
B. Agnello, Marron, and the Early, Uncertain Scope of
Searches Incident to Lawful Arrests ................ 6
C. Go-Bart, Lefkowitz, and the Narrow Construction of
the Proper Scope of Searches Incident to Lawful
Arrests ....................................... 9
D. Post-Prohibition Precedent: The Expansion of the
Scope of Searches Incident to Lawful Arrests in
Harris and Rabinowitz .......................... 11
E. Return to Restrictive: Chimel and the Twin Rationales
Test...............................15
F. Robinson, Belton, and Bright Line Rules... ........... 20
G. Michigan v. Long and the Automobile Frisk.................23
H. Buie, Protective Sweeps, and Suspicionless Searches ...... 25
I. Thornton and Automobile Searches Incident to Lawful
Arrests of Recent Occupants .................... 31
J. Back to Reality: Arizona v. Gant and the Dismantling
of the Belton Fiction .............. .............. 36
III. The Broad Reading of Suspiciousless Buie Searches..........40
IV. Arizona v. Gant Invalidates Suspicionless Buie Searches .....48
A. Introduction ............................... 48
B. How Courts Erred in Construing the Scope of
Suspicionless Buie Searches......................49
1. Buie Searches Cannot Be Justified Unless Preceded
by Lawful Arrests ........ ................. 49
HeinOnline  -- 62 Baylor L. Rev. 1 2010
BAYLOR LAWREVIEW
2. Spaces from Which an Attack Could Immediately
Be Launched Only Include Spaces Large Enough
to Conceal Persons .......................... 50
3. Rooms Connected to the Arrest Room by Hallways
Do Not Immediately Adjoin the Place of Arrest ......... 52
4. Suspicionless Buie Searches Were Never Meant to
Extend Beyond the Arrest Room........ ............. 55
C. Raising Arizona: Arizona v. Gant Compels the
Conclusion that Suspicionless Buie Searches Incident
to Lawful Arrests Are Unconstitutional . ............ 58
1. Suspicionless Buie Searches Cannot Be Defended
Under Chimel ............................... 58
2. Harris and Rabinowitz Now Only Apply to
Automobile Arrests .................. ...... 60
3. Suspicionless Buie Searches Are Not Necessary to
Protect Law Enforcement Safety and Evidentiary
Interests .......................... ...... 60
a. An Individual's Expectation of Privacy Is at Its
Highest in His Home....................61
b. Law Enforcement Interests During Automobile
and Home Arrests Are Not Meaningfully
Different.............................62
c. Established Exceptions Authorize Home
Searches when Safety or Evidentiary Concerns
Demand ........................ 67
V. Conclusion ............................ 70
I. INTRODUCTION
The opinion of the Court insists, however, that its major
premise-that an arrest creates a right to search the place of
arrest-finds support in decisions beginning with Weeks v.
United States. These decisions do not justify today's
decision. They merely prove how a hint becomes a
suggestion, is loosely turned into dictum and finally
2 [Vol. 62:1
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elevated to a decision.'
Justice Frankfurter delivered this passage in his dissenting opinion in
United States v. Rabinowitz, the Supreme Court's 1950 opinion that set the
high water mark for the search incident to a lawful arrest.2 Nineteen years
later, in Chimel v. California, the Court explicitly repudiated Rabinowitz
and held that the proper scope of a search incident to a lawful arrest is
merely "the arrestee's person and the area 'within his immediate control'-
construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence."3  Following Chimel's
4
contraction, however, the Court issued a few opinions of expansion.
In New York. v. Belton, a majority of the Court created what was
subsequently maligned as the Belton fiction: "that articles inside . .. the
passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact generally, even if not
inevitably, within 'the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to
grab a weapon or evidentiary ite[m],"' meaning that officers lawfully
arresting the occupant of a vehicle can automatically search the vehicle's
passenger compartment.5 It was Justice Brennan's reading of the majority
opinion in his dissent, however, that subsequently "predominated." 6
According to Justice Brennan, while the majority found that a single
arresting officer properly searched accessible portions of the passenger
compartment of a vehicle while four arrestees were unsecured, "the result
would presumably would have be the same even if [the officer] had
handcuffed Belton and his companions in the patrol car before placing them
under arrest, and even if his search had extended to locked luggage or other
inaccessible containers located in the back seat of the car."7 In Thornton v.
United States, the Court did not curtail this predominating reading and
instead piled fiction upon (Belton) fiction, finding that Belton authorizes
*Associate Professor, The John Marshall Law School; Editor, EvidenceProf Blog:
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/. I would like to thank Professors Orin Kerr and
Tim O'Neill for their help on this Article.
'United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 75 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
2See infra notes 95-105 and accompanying text.
'395 U.S. 752, 760, 763 (1969).
4See generally Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004); Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S.
325 (1990); Belton v. New York, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
5Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763).
6Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710,1718 (2009).
7Belton, 453 U.S. at 467-68 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2010] 3
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searches of passenger compartments of vehicles incident to the lawful
8arrests of even their recent occupants.
In its 2009 opinion in Arizona v. Gant, the Court finally dismantled the
Belton fiction, concluding that Chimel "continues to define the boundaries
of the [search incident to a lawful arrest] exception" and that Chimel only
authorizes the search of the passenger compartment of a vehicle "when the
arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger
compartment at the time of the search."9 The effect of this opinion on
Belton and Thornton was clear: Gant explicitly overruled the predominating
reading of Belton and rebuked Thornton as an application of Chimel.'o
There was, however, a third post-Chimel Supreme Court opinion that also
expanded the scope of searches incident to lawful arrests." Defendants and
appellants should be able to raise Arizona v. Gant to invalidate an important
part of that opinion as well.12
In Maryland v. Buie, the Court held that as an incident to a lawful
(home) arrest, officers can "as a precautionary matter and without probable
cause or reasonable suspicion, look in closets and other spaces immediately
adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately
launched." 3 This holding was actually dictum, with the controlling portion
of the Court's opinion being that reasonable suspicion is required for
protective sweeps beyond these spaces, such as the search conducted in
Buie. 14 Notwithstanding this fact, however, courts unequivocally have
treated Buie's dictum as gospel and universally found that it authorizes
suspicionless searches of sufficiently large spaces not only in arrest rooms,
but also in rooms immediately abutting arrest rooms and connected to arrest
rooms by hallways. '5 This Article argues that defendants and appellants
should be able to raise both the Arizona v. Gant opinion and the reasoning
within it to argue that the reaffirmation of Chimel and the destruction of the
Belton fiction together invalidate the type of search authorized in Buie's
dictum. It also argues that, even without Gant, courts should have realized
and should now conclude that they have grossly misconstrued the scope of
8See Thornton, 541 U.S. at 622.
9 Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1716, 1719.
old. at 1719.
1 See generally Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990).
2See infra Part IV.
13 Buie, 494 U.S. at 334.
14 d.
"See infra Part III.
4 [Vol. 62:1
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suspicionless Buie searches.
Section II tracks the ebbs and flows in the Supreme Court's treatment of
the search incident to a lawful arrest, from its creation in dictum in Weeks v.
United States to the Court's most recent explanation of the exception in
Gant. Section III sets forth precedent establishing the unduly broad
construction which courts have given to suspicionless Buie searches.
Finally, Section IV argues that, before Gant, courts had stretched the scope
of suspicionless Buie searches beyond the breaking point, and, after Gant,
courts should find that such searches are unconstitutional.
II. THE CREATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SEARCH INCIDENT TO
A LAWFUL ARREST
A. Weeks, Carroll, and the Creation of the Search Incident to a
Lawful Arrest Exception in Dicta
It is well established that warrantless searches are "per se
unreasonable . .. subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions." 6 The Supreme Court's 1914 opinion in Weeks v.
United States is best known for birthing the main remedy for such
unreasonable searches: the exclusionary rule. 17 Before christening this rule,
however, the Court had to find that the search before it did not fall under a
specifically established exception, and Weeks is actually a literal case of the
exception proving the rule.' 8  Before Weeks, the Supreme Court never
mentioned the search incident to a lawful arrest as an exception to the
search warrant requirement,' 9 but Justice Day's opinion articulated such an
exception solely to prove that the exception did not apply and that the
exclusionary rule did.20 According to Justice Day, the exclusionary rule
applied because the subject search did not involve the right, "always
'
6 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
"See 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (holding that the use of illegally seized letters at trial was
"prejudicial error").
1See Posting of Eugene Volokh to The Volokh Conspiracy,
http://www.volokh.com/posts/1241808692.shtml (May 8, 2009, 14:51 EST) (noting that the
phrase "the exception proves the rule" means "seeing the exception, and recognizing that it is an
exception, confirms for us that there is a rule").
19See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 755 (1969) (stating "[a]pproval of a warrantless
search incident to a lawful arrest seems first to have been articulated by the Court in 1914 in
dictum in Weeks v. United States .....
20 See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392.
2010] 5
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recognized under English and American law, to search the person of the
accused when legally arrested, to discover and seize the fruits or evidences
of crimes."2 1
The Court's next reference to the search incident to a lawful arrest also
22came in dictum in another opinion better known for something else. In its
Prohibition-era opinion in Carroll v. United States, the Court addressed the
constitutionality of a warrantless search of an Oldsmobile Roadster by
federal prohibition agents which uncovered bonded whiskey and gin and
which preceded the agents' arrest of the car's occupants.23 The occupants
claimed that the search was unconstitutional as it only could have been
justified as an incident, and not as an antecedent, to a lawful arrest.24 In his
1925 opinion, Chief Justice Taft agreed that the search could not be
justified under the search incident to a lawful arrest exception laid out in
Weeks, but in doing so, he expanded the proper scope of such a (still
hypothetical) search beyond the person of the arrestee to objects within his
control.25 According to his opinion, "[w]hen a man is legally arrested for an
offense, whatever is found upon his person or in his control which it is
unlawful for him to have and which may be used to prove the offense may
be seized and held as evidence in the prosecution." 26  But while the
occupants won the battle, they lost the war. Chief Justice Taft found that
the agents had probable cause to believe that the Roadster contained
intoxicating spirituous liquor and concluded that an exception to the search
warrant requirement exists when an official has "reasonable cause ... that
the contents of [an] automobile offend against the law" (i.e., the automobile
exception).27
B. Agnello, Marron, and the Early, Uncertain Scope of Searches
Incident to Lawful Arrests
Later that same year, the Court had its first opportunity to apply the
search incident to a lawful arrest exception in a controlling portion of its
21 id.
22Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155 (1925).23Id. at 134, 136 (referring to the syllabus).
241Id. at 158.
25See id.
261d. (citing Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392).271d at 158-59, 160.
6 [Vol. 62:1
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opinion. 28 In Agnello v. United States, agents were looking through the
windows of Stephen Alba's house when they saw Frank Agnello apparently
selling packages containing cocaine to an undercover agent.2 9  Then,
without a warrant, they rushed in and arrested Alba, Agnello, and two other
men allegedly involved in a conspiracy to sell cocaine.30 The agents seized
packages from the table where the sale took place and seized from Alba the
money the undercover agent had given him.3 Subsequently, some of the
agents and a city policeman proceeded to Agnello's house and uncovered a
can containing cocaine in his bedroom.32
In upholding the searches at Alba's house but invalidating the search of
Agnello's house, the Court again modified the proper scope of searches
incident to lawful arrests. 3 Justice Butler's opinion articulated the scope of
the search:
The right without a search warrant contemporaneously
to search persons lawfully arrested while committing crime
and to search the place where the arrest is made in order to
find and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits
or as the means by which it was committed, as well as
weapons and other things to effect an escape from custody
is not to be doubted.34
Therefore, as an incident to a lawful arrest, arresting officers could now
search not only for the "fruits or evidences of crimes," but also for weapons
or other instrumentalities that the arrestee could use to escape from
custody.35
However, where those officers could search was less clear. While
Carroll authorized a search of the arrestee and objects within his control, 3 6
Agnello approved a search of "the place where the arrest [wa]s made."3
Was Justice Butler merely restating the proper scope of a valid search
28Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 28 (1925).
'
9Id. at 28-29.
30 d. at 29.
3 2 id.
31Id. at 30.
3 Id.
351d.
36See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1924).
3Agnello, 269 U.S. at 30.
2010] 7
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incident to a lawful arrest, or was he saying that officers arresting a suspect
in the kitchen of his house could search the entire kitchen, or, indeed, the
entire house?38 The Court did not have to answer these questions because
the packages on the table and the money seized from Alba were both clearly
within the arrestees' control and part of the place where the arrest was
made, and the can at Agnello's house was neither.39
The Court's opinion two years later in Marron v. United States, also
written by Justice Butler, was no more edifying on this issue. 40  Like
Carroll, Marron was a Prohibition-era case, and a Prohibition agent
properly procured a warrant authorizing a search for "intoxicating liquors
and articles for their manufacture" at a saloon.4 1 Upon executing the
warrant, agents discovered patrons being furnished intoxicating liquors and
placed the bartender, Birdsall, under arrest.4 2  Subsequently, the agents
combed the area next to the saloon's cash register and found a number of
bills.43 They also searched a closet in the saloon and seized not only large
quantities of liquor, but also, inter alia, "a ledger showing inventories of
",44liquors, receipts, [and] expenses, including gifts to police officers ....
The owner of the saloon thereafter moved for the return of the bills and the
ledger, contending that their seizure was not authorized by the warrant.4 5
The Supreme Court agreed that that the seizure of the bills and the
ledger was not authorized under the warrant but found that they were
properly searched and seized as an incident to a lawful arrest.4 6 According
to Justice Butler, the agents properly arrested Birdsall and "had a right
without a warrant contemporaneously to search the place in order to find
and seize the things used to carry on the criminal enterprise."47 A few
sentences later in the opinion, Butler, speaking with regard to the ledger,
"See James J. Tomkovicz, Divining and Designing the Future of the Search Incident to
Arrest Doctrine: Avoiding Instability, Irrationality, and Infidelity, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1417,
1422 n.24 (2007) (noting that "[t]he Court did not specifically state how broadly 'the place where
the arrest is made' should be interpreted").
39See Agnello, 269 U.S. at 28, 29.
40See generally 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
41Id. at 193.
42Id. at 194.
43 id.
4Id.
45 Id.
46Id. at 198-99.
47 d.
8 [Vol. 62:1
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found that "while it was not on Birdsall's person at the time of his arrest, it
was in his immediate possession and control," seemingly implying that
Agnello did not widen the scope of a search incident to a lawful arrest.48 In
the very next sentence, however, Butler noted that "[t]he authority of
officers to search and seize the things by which the nuisance was being
maintained extended to all parts of the premises used for the unlawful
purpose," intimating that the search could have extended beyond the area of
an arrestee's literal possession and control.49
C. Go-Bart, Lefkowitz, and the Narrow Construction of the Proper
Scope of Searches Incident to Lawful Arrests
Just six years later, in Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, Justice
Butler opted for the more restrictive reading of Marron.50 Go-Bart was yet
another Prohibition-era case, with prohibition agents executing an arrest
warrant against defendants whom they believed were using a company to
commit a nuisance against the United States by possessing, transporting,
selling, and soliciting and receiving orders for intoxicating liquor in
violation of the National Prohibition Act.' Upon executing the arrest
warrant at the defendants' office, the agents arrested Phillip Gowen and
William Bartles, neither of whom were committing illegal acts at the time
of arrest.52 Despite not having a search warrant for the premises, the agents
falsely informed the arrestees that they had such a warrant, searched the
men, and recovered papers from both.53 By threat of force, the agents also
compelled Gowen to open a desk and safe, from which they recovered, inter
alia, other papers, account books, and cancelled checks.54
Gowen and Bartles subsequently moved for the suppression of the items
seized after their arrests, and the prosecution countered that these items
were properly searched and seized incident to their lawful arrests. 5 The
Supreme Court unanimously agreed with Gowen and Bartles, concluding
that "[p]lainly the case before [it w]as essentially different from Marron,"
48Id. at 199.
49 See id.
50282 U.S. 344, 358 (1931).
5 1Id. at 349.
52Id. at 349, 357.
13 Id. at 349.
MId. at 349-50.
" Id. at 350.
2010]1 9
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distinguishing Marron in two narrow respects.56 First, whereas the agents
arrested Gowen and Bartles while they were not committing illegal acts, the
officers in Marron arrested "Birdsall who in pursuance of a conspiracy was
actually engaged in running a saloon."s? Second, the Court noted that in
Marron, agents "seized a ledger in a closet ... and some bills beside the
cash register" and concluded that these searches were proper because,
unlike in Go-Bart, "[t]hese things were visible and accessible and in the
offender's immediate custody. There was no threat of force or general
search or rummaging of the place."58
The Court reached a similar conclusion in its final Prohibition-era
search incident to a lawful arrest opinion the following year, United States
v. Lejkowitz, another unanimous opinion written by Justice Butler.59 In
Le/kowitz, a deputy marshal and three other Prohibition agents executed an
arrest warrant at a one room apartment based upon probable cause that its
occupants were conspiring "to sell, possess, transport, furnish, deliver, and
take orders for intoxicating liquor contrary to the National Prohibition
Act." 6 0 As in Go-Bart, the officials arrested two individuals, neither of
whom was committing illegal acts at the time of arrest.6 1 Also, as in Go-
Bart, despite not having a search warrant, the officials proceeded to search
the place of arrest, this time recovering items from desks, a towel cabinet,
and baskets. 62
After the defendants moved to suppress these items, Butler again
deemed the searches unconstitutional, drawing the same two distinctions
between the case before him and Marron.63 Butler again noted that the
defendants in the present case were not committing illegal acts at the time
of their arrests while Marron involved a search conducted after the arrest of
"the bartender for crime openly being committed in their presence."6" And
he again noted that the ledger and bills seized in Marron "being in plain
view were picked up by officers as an incident of the arrest."65 Conversely,
16 d at 358.
MId. at 357-58.
s8 d. at 358.
59 See generally 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
6Im. at 458.
61 d. at 462-63.
621Id. at 459-60.
61Id. at 465.
6Id at 459-60, 465.
65id.
10 [Vol. 62:1
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the items seized by the officials in Le/kowitz were not the fruits of a proper
search incident to a lawful arrest because they were concealed and only
uncovered as part of searches that "were exploratory and general ....
D. Post-Prohibition Precedent: The Expansion of the Scope of
Searches Incident to Lawful Arrests in Harris and Rabinowitz
This restrictive reading of the proper scope of a valid search incident to
a lawful arrest, however, died along with Prohibition. The Supreme Court
next addressed the scope of a valid search incident to a lawful arrest in 1947
in Harris v. United States, but now with a completely different lineup of
Justices.67 In Harris, officials procured two arrest warrants for George
Harris, who allegedly had violated both the Mail Fraud Statute and the
National Stolen Property Act. Five FBI agents then executed those
warrants at Harris' four room apartment and arrested him in the living room
while he was not committing any illegal acts.69 Then, despite not having a
search warrant, the agents conducted a search of the living room and each
of the apartment's other three rooms for approximately five hours. 70 That
search uncovered World War II draft cards, and Harris was eventually
charged with "the unlawful possession, concealment and alteration of
certain Notice of Classification Cards and Registration Certificates... ."n.
Harris thereafter moved to suppress the draft cards, but the Supreme
Court, in a majority opinion penned by Chief Justice Vinson, found that the
agents properly seized them as part of a valid search incident to a lawful
arrest.72 The Court noted that it was undisputed that a search incident to a
lawful arrest can extend to the area under the arrestee's immediate control
and then found no support "for the suggestion that [such a] search could not
validly extend beyond the room in which the petitioner was arrested."73
In distinguishing the Court's two previous opinions, Chief Justice
Vinson concluded that "[t]he searches found to be invalid in the Go-Bart
66Id. at 464-65.
67See generally 331 U.S. 145 (1947), overruled in part by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969).68 1d. at 148.
69 See id.
701d. at 149.
7 1Id. at 146-47, 149.
721d. at 149, 153-54.
71Id. at 151-52.
2010] 11I
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and Lejkowitz cases were so held for reasons other than the areas covered
by the searches."7 4 Instead, the majority construed those cases as ones "in
which law enforcement officers ha[d] entered premises ostensibly for the
purpose of making an arrest but in reality for the purpose of conducting a
general exploratory search for merely evidentiary materials tending to
connect the accused with some crime."75 Four dissenting justices disagreed
with this characterization of Go-Bart and Le/kowitz.76 Justice Frankfurter
concluded that the majority was "throw[ing] to the winds the latest
unanimous decisions of this Court on the allowable range of search without
warrant incidental to lawful arrest."7 7  Justice Jackson found that the
problem with the majority's opinion was "that once the search is allowed to
go beyond the person arrested and the objects upon him or in his immediate
physical control, I see no practical limit short of that set in the opinion of
the ChiefJustice-and that means to me no limit at all."
According to the majority opinion, however, the Court was not laying
down a bright line rule that an arresting officer can always extend his search
beyond the room in which a suspect is arrested.79 Instead, Chief Justice
Vinson claimed that he was upholding the subject search because Harris
had control over the entire apartment and the "instrumentalities of the
crimes charged in the warrants could easily have been concealed in any of
the four rooms of the apartment."80 He cautioned that "[o]ther situations
may arise in which the nature and size of the object sought or the lack of
effective control over the premises on the part of the persons arrested may
require that the searches be less extensive."81
A mere year later, however, Chief Justice Vinson found himself on the
wrong side of the Court's next search incident to a lawful arrest opinion,
which drastically, yet ultimately briefly, altered its application.82 In
74Id. at 152 n.16.
7Id. at 153.
76Id. at 167 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); id. at 188 (Murphy, J., dissenting); id. at 197
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
nId. at 167 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 197 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
79Id. at 152 (majority opinion) (stating that the courts must look to "the particular
circumstances of the particular case").
80ld.
t1 Id.
82 See generally Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948), overruled in part by United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
12 [Vol. 62:1I
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Trupiano v. United States, the Alcohol Tax Unit of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue learned that the defendants sought to lease part of a farm and build
and operate an illegal still on it.83 The Unit continued to monitor the
defendants' activities for the next four to five months, with one agent
gathering information while working undercover on the farm as a "dumb
farm hand."84 Upon receiving a dispatch from the undercover agent that the
defendants were about to ship alcohol, other agents conducted a warrantless
raid of the farm. After arresting one of the defendants, agents seized cans
containing alcohol and distillery equipment such as large mash vats. 86
The defendants subsequently moved to suppress this evidence, and the
Supreme Court, in a majority opinion written by Justice Murphy, agreed,
concluding that "there must be something more in the way of necessity than
merely a lawful arrest" for officers to be able to conduct a warrantless
search.8 7 In other words, according to the Court, "there must be some other
factor in the situation that would make it unreasonable or impracticable to
require the arresting officer to equip himself with a search warrant."8  The
problem for the prosecution was that the majority found that in the present
case, "no reason whatever ha[d] been shown why the arresting officers
could not have armed themselves during all the weeks of their surveillance
of the locus with a duly obtained search warrant .... 89 Instead, "[t]he
agents of the Alcohol Tax Unit knew every detail of the construction and
operation of the illegal distillery long before the raid was made." 90
Justice Murphy found no need to reconcile his majority opinion with the
majority opinion in Harris because he saw the case before him as
"relat[ing] only to the seizure of contraband the existence and precise nature
and location of which the law enforcement officers were aware long before
making the lawful arrest." 91 Conversely, he found among other things that
this "circumstance was wholly lacking in the Harris case, which was
concerned with the permissible scope of a general search without a warrant
" Id. at 701.
8"See id. at 701-02.
"sId. at 702-03.
861d.
17Id. at 703, 708.
81Id. at 708.
89 d.
"Id. at 706.
91Id. at 708.
2010] 13
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as an incident to a lawful arrest." 92
Chief Justice Vinson filed a dissenting opinion, joined by three other
Justices, in which he claimed that the majority opinion was inconsistent
with the "long line of decisions in th[e] Court recognizing as consistent
with the restrictions of the Fourth Amendment the power of law-
enforcement officers to make reasonable searches and seizures as incidents
to lawful arrests."9 3 While Vinson's opinion did not take the day, Trupiano
remained on the books for less than two years, and Vinson's construction of
the search incident to a lawful arrest would thereafter rule the Fourth
Amendment roost for almost two decades.94
This sea change came in the Court's 1950 opinion in United States v.
Rabinowitz.9 5  In Rabinowitz, government officers executed an arrest
warrant at the office of Albert Rabinowitz, and, over his objection and
without a search warrant, "searched the desk, safe, and file cabinets in the
office for about an hour and a half."96 The searches uncovered, inter alia,
stamps with forged overprints, and Rabinowitz was charged with selling,
possessing, and concealing forged and altered obligations of the United
States with intent to defraud.97 Rabinowitz subsequently moved to suppress
98the stamps. While Rabinowitz was convicted by the trial court, the court
of appeals reversed, claiming that pursuant to Trupiano, the officers had to
procure a search warrant before searching for the stamps.99
The Supreme Court disagreed on the requirement of a search warrant:
A rule of thumb requiring that a search warrant always
be procured whenever practicable may be appealing from
the vantage point of easy administration. But we cannot
agree that this requirement should be crystallized into a
sine qua non to the reasonableness of the search.' 00
92Id at 708-09.
93Id at 710, 713-14 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
94See generally United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (overruling Trupiano in
part), overruled in part by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
9s Id.
96 Id. at 58-59.
"Id. at 59.
98Id.
9Id.
'"Id. at 65.
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Therefore, the Court held that "[t]o the extent that Trupiano . . . requires
a search warrant solely upon the basis of the practicability of procuring it
rather than upon the reasonableness of the search after a lawful arrest, that
case is overruled."' 01
This conclusion led the Court to deny Rabinowitz's motion to suppress
because it deemed the searches of the desk, safe, and file cabinets
reasonable for the same reasons proffered in Harris: it found Go-Bart and
Lefkowitz to be cases "that condemned generally exploratory searches,
which cannot be undertaken by officers with or without a warrant." 02
Thus, even though the stamps were not in plain view, they were reasonably
seized because "[i]n the instant case the search was not general or
exploratory... ."103
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Frankfurter claimed that the decisions
cited as support for the majority's opinion, starting with Weeks, did "not
justify today's decision. They merely prove how a hint becomes a
suggestion, is loosely turned into dictum and finally elevated to a
decision."'10 4  It would be nineteen years before Justice Frankfurter's
opinion and the logic of Go-Bart and Lejkowitz would command the
endorsement of the majority of the Court.os
E. Return to Restrictive: Chimel and the Twin Rationales Test
In the interim, the Court nibbled around the edges of Rabinowitz
without really taking a substantial bite.'06 Then, by reaching its landmark
'
1Id at 66 (citation omitted).
102Id. at 62-63.
103 id.
14Id. at 75 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
105 See generally Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
"0See Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216, 220 (1968) (invalidating the search
of a car alleged to be incident to a lawful arrest because it "did not take place until petitioners
were in custody inside the courthouse and the car was parked on the street outside"); James v.
Louisiana, 382 U.S. 36, 36-37 (1965) (relying upon Stoner to invalidate the search of an arrestee's
home, which was more than two blocks away from the site of the arrest); Preston v. United States,
376 U.S. 364, 368 (1964) (finding that the search of an arrestee's automobile long after his arrest
'was too remote in time or place to have been made as incidental to the arrest"); Stoner v.
California, 376 U.S. 483, 486, 490 (1964) (finding that the search of an arrestee's hotel room two
days before his arrest was unconstitutional because "a search can be incident to an arrest only if it
is substantially contemporaneous with the arrest and is confined to the immediate vicinity of the
arrest"); United States v. Abel, 362 U.S. 217, 235 (1960) (finding that the several cases on the
search incident to a lawful arrest "cannot be satisfactorily reconciled," but concluding that "[t]his
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1968 ruling in Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court greased the wheels for the
removal of Rabinowitz and Harris from Fourth Amendment doctrine. 0 7
Terry reinforced the principle that "the police must, whenever practicable,
obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the
warrant procedure."108 Of course, the Court only laid out this principle to
establish that "necessarily swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot
observations of [police] officer[s] on the beat ... historically has not been,
and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant
procedure."l 09 The Court explained a police offer's ability to search a
person:
[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which
leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience
that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons
with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently
dangerous, where in the course of investigating this
behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes
reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages
of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his
own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of
himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited
search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to
discover weapons which might be used to assault him." 0
Because of the nature and extent of the governmental interests and the
intrusion on individual rights in this context, the Court found that such stops
and frisks could be justified on something less than probable cause:
"specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion," i.e., reasonable
suspicion."' Terry laid the table for the Court's opinion the following year
in Chimel v. California.112
is not the occasion to attempt to reconcile all the decisions, or to re-examine them").
1o7See generally 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
1
osId. at 20.
1I9d.
"od at 30.
'.Id. at 20-21.
"
2 See Thomas K. Clancy, Protective Searches, Pat-Downs, or Frisks?: The Scope of
Permissible Intrusion to Ascertain if a Detained Person is Armed, 82 MARQ. L. REv. 491, 528
(1999) ("In so limiting the scope of a search incident to arrest, the Chimel Court explicitly relied
16 [Vol. 62: 1
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In Chimel v. California, three police officers went to Ted Chimel's three
bedroom house to execute an arrest warrant for the burglary of a coin shop
and arrested him at the entrance to his house.' 13 Then, without a search
warrant and over Chimel's objection, the officers searched the entire house
over the next forty-five minutes to an hour.' 14 During their search of the
master bedroom and a sewing room, the officers directed Chimel's wife to
open drawers and "'physically move contents of the drawers from side to
side so that [they] might view any items that would have come from [the]
burglary. '",1 15
Chimel moved to suppress coins that the officers found during their
search, but the California state courts denied his motion on the ground that
the officers' search of the entire house was a valid search incident to a
lawful arrest in compliance with Rabinowitz."'6 The Supreme Court later
granted cert and began by tracing the history of the search incident to a
lawful arrest from Weeks to Rabinowitz." 7 In his majority opinion, Justice
Stewart characterized Harris as throwing "[t]he limiting views expressed in
Go-Bart and Lefkowitz ... to the winds. . . .""s Moreover, he found that
the doctrine of Rabinowitz, that arresting officers can search any area within
the possession or under the control of the arrestee, "at least in the broad
sense in which it was applied by the California courts in this case, can
withstand neither historical nor rational analysis."119 Instead, the Court
concluded that Rabinowitz was "hardly founded on an unimpeachable line
of authority" and endorsed Justice Frankfurter's dictum dissent, 120 noting
that "the approach taken in cases such as Go-Bart, Le/kowitz, and Trupiano
was essentially disregarded by the Rabinowitz Court."l 2 1
The Court then used Terry as the guiding light to redraw the lines of
searches incident to lawful arrests. Justice Stewart noted that the Court had
found in Terry that "[t]he scope of [a warrantless] search must be 'strictly
on Terry for the proposition that 'a search must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the
circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible."').
"'395 U.S. 752, 753-54 (1969).
'
1 4 Id.
" Id. at 754.
116 Id. at 754-55.
"
7 Id. at 755-60.
" Id. at 757-58.
"
9 Id. at 760.
120See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
121 Chimel, 395 U.S. at 760.
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tied to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation
permissible."1 22  He then analogized Terry stops and frisks to the case
before him, concluding that "[a] similar analysis underlies the 'search
incident to arrest' principle, and marks its proper extent."1 2 3 According to
the Court, there are twin rationales supporting searches incident to lawful
arrests:
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting
officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any
weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist
arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety
might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated.
In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer
to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's
person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction.12 4
Based upon these twin rationales, the Court also found that "the area
into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary
items must, of course, be governed by a like rule." 2 5 The Court reached
this conclusion because "[a] gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one
who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed
in the clothing of the person arrested."l 26 Therefore, a search incident to a
lawful arrest may only include "the arrestee's person and the area 'within
his immediate control'-construing that phrase to mean the area from
within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible
evidence."l 27  Conversely, the Court concluded that "[t]here is no
comparable justification .. . for routinely searching any room other than
that in which an arrest occurs-or, for that matter, for searching through all
the desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that room itself."l 2 8
Instead, "[s]uch searches, in the absence of well-recognized exceptions,
may be made only under the authority of a search warrant." 2 9
Then, rather than distinguishing Harris and Rabinowitz, as the majority
122Id. at 762 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1969)).
13id.
124Id. at 762-63.
121Id. at 763.
1261d.
127id.
I28 Id.
129d.
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opinions in those cases had done with Go-Bart and Lejkowitz, Justice
Stewart declared them no longer good law. 130 Justice Stewart noted that
Chimel "correctly point[ed] out that one result of decisions such as
Rabinowitz and Harris is to give law enforcement officials the opportunity
to engage in searches not justified by probable cause, by the simple
expedient of arranging to arrest suspects at home rather than elsewhere." 3 1
While not necessarily agreeing with Chimel that the police deliberately
arrested him at home so that they could search his house, Justice Stewart
concluded that "the fact remain[ed] that had [Chimel] been arrested earlier
in the day, at his place of employment rather than at home, no search of his
house could have been made without a search warrant." 3 2
Justice Stewart did acknowledge that it would be possible to distinguish
these two cases because "Rabinowitz involved a single room, and Harris a
four-room apartment, while in the case before us an entire house was
searched."1 3 3 He found, however, that "such a distinction would be highly
artificial," agreeing with Justice Jackson's dissenting opinion in Harris that
"[n]o consideration relevant to the Fourth Amendment suggests any point
of rational limitation, once the search is allowed to go beyond the area from
which the person arrested might obtain weapons or evidentiary items."l 34
And while the Harris majority was not willing to lay down a bright line rule
that an arresting officer can always extend his search beyond the room in
which a suspect is arrested, the Chimel majority was willing to draw such a
line in the opposite direction, deeming unconstitutional not only searches
incident to lawful arrests that extend beyond the room of arrest but also
searches within the arrest room but beyond the reach of the arrestee.135
According to the Court, "[t]he only reasoned distinction is one between a
search of the person arrested and the area within his reach on the one hand,
and more extensive searches on the other."l 36
130 See id. at 768 ("It is time ... to hold that on their own facts, and insofar as the principles
they stand for are inconsistent with those that we have endorsed today, [Harris and Rabinowitz]
are no longer to be followed").
3 1Id. at 767.
I32 id.
133 Id. at 766.
134 id.
13Id
136Id.
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F. Robinson, Belton, and Bright Line Rules
The Supreme Court's next major search incident to a lawful arrest
opinion, United States v. Robinson, made clear that this bright line rule
applied both ways.1 37 According to Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion,
while the Chimel twin rationales mark the proper scope of a search incident
to a lawful arrest, neither of those rationales need be established in any
particular case for the search of an arrestee to be deemed constitutional. 3 8
In Robinson, Officer Richard Jenks arrested Willie Robinson, Jr. for
operating a motor vehicle after the revocation of his operator's permit, a
crime not especially likely to involve evidentiary items or an armed and
dangerous subject (i.e., either of Chimel's rationales).13 9 Nonetheless, Jenks
proceeded to search Robinson, uncovering fourteen gelatin capsules
containing heroin. 40
The heroin was admitted into evidence, which led to Robinson's
conviction in the district court. The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia reversed, "suggesti[ng] that there must be litigated in
each case the issue of whether or not there was present one of the reasons
supporting the authority for a search of the person incident to a lawful
arrest." 4 1 The Supreme Court then reversed the appellate court, rejecting
"such a case-by-case adjudication."l 4 2 The Court found such a requirement
impractical:
A police officer's determination as to how to and where to
search the person of a suspect whom he has arrested is
necessarily a quick ad hoc judgment which the Fourth
Amendment does not require to be broken down in each
instance into an analysis of each step in the search.14 3
Thus, the validity of a search incident to a lawful arrest "does not
depend on what a court may later decide was the probability in a particular
arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon the
...See 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
1381Id.
"Id. at 221, 227.
140Id. at 223.
14 1Id. at 235.
I42 id.
143 d.
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person of the suspect."l 4 4  Instead, when an arrest is lawful, "a search
incident to the arrest requires no additional justification."1 45 This is because
"[i]t is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to
search.. ."46 This principle continues to guide Supreme Court precedent,
with the Supreme Court recently recognizing in its 1998 opinion in Knowles
v. Iowa that Robinson does not authorize searches incident to the lawful
issuance of traffic citations,14 7 thus "reaffirm[ing] its fealty to the sine qua
non of arrest as a constitutional precondition to search incident
authority." 48
While Robinson established the bright line rule that an officer may
always search an arrestee as an incident to his lawful arrest,14 9 the Supreme
Court's 1981 opinion in New York v. Belton established that an arresting
officer may always search the passenger compartment of an arrestee's
automobile for similar reasons.150 In Belton, Trooper Douglas Nicot pulled
over a speeding automobile on the New York Thruway, determined that
none of the four occupants owned the vehicle or was related to its owner,
smelled burned marijuana emanating from the car, and saw on the car's
floor an envelope marked "Supergold" that he associated with marijuana.'51
Nicot then arrested the four men, including Roger Belton, split them into
four separate areas of the Thruway, picked up the envelope and found that it
contained marijuana, and searched the vehicle's passenger compartment,
recovering from the back seat Belton's black leather jacket, which had
cocaine in one of its pockets.152
Belton thereafter moved to suppress the cocaine, but the Supreme Court
found that the search was constitutional.' 53 In Justice Stewart's majority
opinion, the Court began by citing to a law review article written in
response to Robinson, which had concluded that "[a] highly sophisticated
set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the
1Id.
145 Id
146d.
147525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998).
148 Wayne A. Logan, An Exception Swallows a Rule: Police Authority to Search Incident to
Arrest, 19 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 381, 399 (2001).
149 See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.
150453 U.S. 454,460 (1981).
"s Id. at 455-56.
152 id. at 456.
15 1 Id. at 456, 462-63.
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drawing of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions .. . may be 'literally
impossible of application by the officer in the field."' 5 4  According to
Justice Stewart, this was why the Court in Robinson had "hewed to a
straightforward rule, easily applied, and predictably enforced" for the
search of an arrestee incident to his lawful arrest.'5 5 But the Court found
that "no straightforward rule had emerged from litigated cases
respecting . . . the question of the proper scope of a search of the interior of
an automobile incident to a lawful custodial arrest of its occupants."l 56 In
other words, the Court concluded that "courts ha[d] found no workable
definition of the 'area within the immediate control of the arrestee' when
that area arguably includes the interior of an automobile and the arrestee is
its recent occupant." 57
Justice Stewart was, however, able to divine from these lower court
opinions "the generalization that articles inside the relatively narrow
compass of the passenger compartment of an automobile are generally, if
not inevitably, within 'the area into which an arrestee might reach in order
to grab a weapon or evidentiary ite[m]."" 58  Therefore, "[i]n order to
establish the workable rule this category of cases requires [the Court] read
Chimel's definition of the limits of the area that may be searched in light of
that generalization."1 5 9  Justice Stewart thus concluded "that when a
policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an
automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the
passenger compartment of that automobile."l 6 0
Moreover, Justice Stewart found that it followed "from this conclusion
that the police may also examine the contents of any containers found
within the passenger compartment, for if the passenger compartment is
within the reach of the arrestee, so also will containers in it be within his
reach.""' This distinction allowed the Court to distinguish Chimel, which
held that after an officer arrests a suspect at home, he may only search
"drawers within the arrestee's reach" and "could not search all the drawers
154 Id. at 458 (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, "Case-By-Case Adjudication" Versus
"Standardized Procedures ": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REv. 127, 141 (1974)).
51d. at 459.
1 Id.
I571d. at 460.
s
58 Id. (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)).
15old.
1' Id.
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in an arrestee's house."l 62 In other words, according to the Court, the rest
of the house, and even much of the room of arrest, is not within the reach of
a suspect arrested at home, but the entire passenger compartment of a car is
within the reach of an arrested occupant, even if an officer has already
removed him from the car.16 3 Stewart claimed that the Court was merely
"determin[ing] the meaning of Chimel's principles" and "in no way
alter[ing] the fundamental principles established in the Chimel case
regarding the basic scope of searches incident to lawful custodial arrests."' 6
Conversely, according to Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion, the
majority was making a mockery of Chimel.'65 Justice Brennan began by
disparaging the majority's opinion as disregarding the twin Chimel
rationales and "instead adopt[ing] a fiction-that the interior of a car is
always within the immediate control of an arrestee who has recently been in
the car." 66 According to Justice Brennan, under the majority opinion, "the
result would presumably be the same even if Officer Nicot had handcuffed
Belton and his companions in the patrol car before placing them under
arrest, and even if his search had extended to locked luggage or other
inaccessible containers located in the back seat of the car."' 6 7 Although
Justice Brennan's reading of the majority's opinion was done disparagingly,
his reading soon "predominated." 6 8 It would be twenty-eight years before
the Court finally decided to overrule this so-called Belton fiction.169
G. Michigan v. Long and the Automobile Frisk
While, as noted, Terry led the Supreme Court to restrict the proper
scope of searches incident to lawful arrests in Chimel, Belton was
instrumental in the Court expanding the scope of a proper Terry frisk from
the outer clothing of a suspect to the passenger compartment of a car in its
1983 opinion in Michigan v. Long.170 In Long, Deputies Howell and Lewis
observed a car traveling erratically and at an excessive speed before it
'
62 Id. at 46 1.
161 Id. at 460-61.
'"Id. at 460 n.3.
165 See id. at 464 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1"Id. at 466 (emphasis in original).
161 Id. at 468.
'"See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1718, 1719 (2009).
169 SdS
170 See generally 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
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swerved off into a shallow ditch."' The deputies approached the car, and
Howell asked its driver, David Long, to produce his driver's license, but
Long did not respond until Howell repeated his request. 172 Howell then
made two requests for Long's registration, which merely led to Long,
whom Howell thought appeared to be under the influence of something,
turning from the deputies and walking toward the open door of his car.173
The deputies followed Long and observed a large hunting knife on the
floorboard of the driver's side of the car.174  They then proceeded to
conduct a fruitless Terry frisk of Long, followed by a search of the
passenger compartment of the car, which uncovered marijuana.175  Long
moved to suppress the marijuana, with the Supreme Court of Michigan
ultimately agreeing with him because '" Terry authorized only a limited pat-
down search of a person suspected of criminal activity' rather than a search
of an area."'1
7 6
The Supreme Court disagreed, noting that "[i]n two cases in which we
applied Terry to specific factual situations, we recognized that investigative
detentions involving suspects in vehicles are especially fraught with danger
to police officers." 77  One of those cases was Pennsylvania v. Mimms,
where the Court adopted a bright line rule based on concerns about officer
safety: "once a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic
violation, the police officers may order the driver to get out of the vehicle
without violating the Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable
searches and seizures."1 7 8 The other was Adams v. Williams, in which the
Court cited to a study indicating that 'approximately 30% of police
shootings occurred when a police officer approached a suspect seated in an
automobile."' 1 7
9
The Court then read Mimms, Williams, Belton, and Terry as indicating
"that protection of police and others can justify protective searches when
'
7 1Id. at 1035.
1721Id. at 1035-36.
1
73 Id. at 1035.
174 id.
75 id.
176 Id. at 1036, 1045 (quoting People v. Long, 320 N.W.2d 866, 869 (Mich. 1982) (emphasis
in original)).
77Id. at 1047.
178434 U.S. 106, 11i & n.6 (1977).
179407 U.S. 143, 148 n.3 (1972) (citing Allen P. Bristow, Police Officer Shootings-A
Tactical Evaluation, 54 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SC. 1, 93-94 (1963)).
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police have a reasonable belief that the suspect poses a danger, that roadside
encounters between police and suspects are especially hazardous, and that
danger may arise from the possible presence of weapons in the area
surrounding a suspect."180  The Court extended the holdings of these
opinions to the case before it:
[T]he search of the passenger compartment of an
automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon may
be placed or hidden, is permissible if the police officer
possesses a reasonable belief based on "specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with the rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant" the officer
in believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect
may gain immediate control of weapons. 8 1
H. Buie, Protective Sweeps, and Suspicionless Searches
Just as Belton begat the Court's extension of the scope of protective
searches from a suspect's outer clothing to the passenger compartment of an
automobile in Michigan v. Long, Long led to the Court expanding its scope
still further and, in dictum, broadening the scope of searches incident to
lawful arrests. In Maryland v. Buie, a man wearing a red running suit and
another man robbed a Godfather's Pizza restaurant.182 Police believed that
the men were Jerome Buie and Lloyd Allen, and they obtained warrants for
their arrests, which six or seven officers executed at Buie's house.1 83 Once
inside Buie's house, the officers fanned throughout it, with Corporal James
Rozar shouting into the basement, ordering anyone in it to come out. 184
Buie responded to Rozar and eventually emerged from the basement, with
Rozar arresting him at the top of the staircase to the basement.185 Detective
Joseph Frolich then "entered the basement 'in case there was someone else'
down there" and "noticed a red running suit lying in plain view on a stack
of clothing and seized it."186 Buie subsequently moved to suppress the red
i8oLong, 463 U.S. at 1049.
'Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).
82494 U.S. 325, 328 (1990).
83 Id.
t Id.
185Id.; see also Buie v. State, 580 A.2d 167, 171 (Md. 1990) ("Buie ascended the stairs at
gunpoint and was immediately arrested."), rev'd, 494 U.S. 325 (1990).
'
86Buie, 494 U.S. at 328.
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running suit, and while the lower Maryland courts denied his motion, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed, finding that to justify a protective
sweep of a home after an arrest, such as the one that Frolich conducted in
the basement, arresting officers must have, and Detective Frolich did not
have, probable cause to believe that a serious and demonstrable potentiality
for danger exists.
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the Court of Appeals of
Maryland by drawing a parallel between Terry, Long, and Buie. In the
introduction to its opinion, the Court began by defining a "protective
sweep" as "a quick and limited search of premises, incident to an arrest and
conducted to protect the safety of police officers or others" that is "narrowly
confined to a cursory visual inspection of those places in which a person
might be hiding."18 8 Thereafter, the Court framed the issue before it as
"what level of justification is required .. . before police officers . .. may
conduct a warrantless protective sweep of all or part of the premises."
Then, before the Court got into the body of its opinion, it previewed its
decision:
We conclude that the Fourth Amendment would permit the
protective sweep undertaken here if the searching officer
"possesse[d] a reasonable belief based on 'specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with the rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant[ed]' the
officers in believing," that the area swept harbored an
individual posing a danger to the officer or others.190
Thereafter, in the body of its opinion, the Court explained why it could
and had to rely on Terry and Long to reach its conclusion. It noted that
because the arresting officers had "an arrest warrant and probable cause to
believe that Buie was in his home, the officers were entitled to enter and to
search anywhere in the house in which Buie might be found."'91 The
problem for the arresting officers, however, was that once they found Buie,
"there was no longer that particular justification for entering any rooms that
had not yet been searched."' 92 This is where Terry and Long came into
117 Id. at 328-29.
"' Id. at 327.
189 Id.
'"Id. (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049-50 (1983)).
"
' Id. at 332-33.
192Id. at 333.
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play.
According to the Court, the fact "[t]hat Buie had an expectation of
privacy in those remaining areas of his house .. . d[id] not mean such
rooms were immune from entry." 93 The Court articulated the underlying
rationale:
In Terry and Long we were concerned with the immediate
interest of the police officers in taking steps to assure
themselves that the persons with whom they were dealing
were not armed with, or able to gain immediate control of,
a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used
against them.1 94
It then found that "[i]n the instant case, there is an analogous interest of
the officers in taking steps to assure themselves that the house in which a
suspect is being, or has just been, arrested is not harboring other persons
who are dangerous and who could unexpectedly launch an attack."l 95
The Court's parallel then extended to the risks faced by officers as it
concluded that "[t]he risk of danger in the context of an arrest in the home
is as great as, if not greater than, it is in an on-the-street or roadside
investigatory encounter."196 This is because, "unlike an encounter on the
street or along a highway, an in-home arrest puts the officer at the
disadvantage of being on his adversary's turf," with "[a]n ambush in a
confined setting of unknown configuration. . . more to be feared than it is
in open, more familiar settings."
In reaching this conclusion, the Court likely relied upon similar
arguments in the government's brief and two amicus curiae briefs. In its
brief, the government argued that protective sweeps are justified in part
because "[a]n accomplice, lurking in another room, might take someone
hostage or attack the officers or the arrestee as they are leaving the
premises."' 98 Meanwhile, both amicus briefs cited Wayne LaFave's treatise
on Search and Seizure regarding the risk of unknown dangers:
It would make little sense to say that police may take
13id.
194id.
15Id.
%Id.
197 id.
19 8Brief for Petitioner at 15, Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (No. 88-1369), 1989 WL 1127006.
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protective measures against those known to be present, but
that they may never stray beyond the room of the arrest to
see if there are others present who, by virtue of their
location, may be in an even more advantageous position to
offer forcible resistance on behalf of the arrestee. 199
The Court did acknowledge "that entering rooms not examined prior to
the arrest is [not] a de minimis intrusion that may be disregarded," but it
found that "arresting officers are permitted in such circumstances to take
reasonable steps to ensure their safety after, and while making, the
arrest."20 0  These conclusions prompted the Court to issue a two-part
holding:
[A]s an incident to the arrest the officers could, as a
precautionary matter and without probable cause or
reasonable suspicion, look in closets and other spaces
immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an
attack could be immediately launched. Beyond that,
however, we hold that there must be articulable facts
which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in
believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual
posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.20 1
Immediately after this two-part holding, the Court added that "[t]his is
no more and no less than was required in Terry and Long, and as in those
cases, we think this balance is the proper one."2 02 In the footnote
accompanying this statement, the Court found that "[t]he State's argument
that no level of objective justification should be required because of 'the
danger that inheres in the in-home arrest for a violent crime . . .' [wa]s
rebutted by Terry. . . itself."2 03 The State's Belton-esque argument was that
"' [o]fficers facing the life threatening situation of arresting a violent
criminal in the home should not be forced to pause and ponder the legal
1Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of the State of Maryland, and
Amicus Curiae in Support of the State of Maryland at 8, Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (No. 88-1369), 1989
WL 1127010; Brief Amici Curiae of Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc. et al. in
Support of Petitioner at 8, Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (No. 88-1369), 1989 WL 1127003.
2mBuie, 494 U.S. at 333-34.
20 Id. at 334.
202id.
203Id. at 334 n.2. (citations omitted).
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subtleties associated with a quantum of proof analysis."' 2 04  The Court
turned this argument aside, finding that "despite the danger that inheres in
on-the-street encounters and the need for police to act quickly for their own
safety, the Court in Terry did not adopt a bright-line rule authorizing frisks
for weapons in all confrontational encounters."205 Instead, "[e]ven in high
crime areas, where the possibility that any given individual is armed is
significant, Terry requires reasonable, individualized suspicion before a
frisk for weapons can be conducted." 20 6 The Court then pronounced that it
was applying this same, reasonable suspicion approach to the protective
sweep of a house.207 According to the Court, the problem with requiring
anything less is that, inter alia, "the existence of the arrest warrant implies
nothing about whether dangerous third parties will be found in the
arrestee's house."208
Thus, while the Court in Buie seemingly authorized two distinct types of
post-arrest searches, it is clear that the Court's recognition of the second
type of search-the "protective sweep"-was its holding while its
comments regarding the first type of search were merely dictum.209 What
courts have since referred to as the first type of Buie search is the search of
"closets and other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from
which an attack could be immediately launched." 21 0 As the Court indicated,
this type of search is "incident to the arrest" and thus a search incident to a
lawful arrest. 2 11  And, as such, as the Court found with regard to the
searches of arrestees in Robinson, such searches are automatically
authorized by the arrest itself; the arresting officers need not have probable
cause or even reasonable suspicion that an attack might be launched from
the space to be searched.2 12
204 Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 23, Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (No. 88-1369)).
205id.
206 id.
207id.
208 d.
209See, e.g., United States v. McQuagge, 787 F. Supp. 637, 655 (E.D. Tex. 1991) ("In Buie,
the court noted, in dicta, that as an incident to an arrest, officers can 'as a precautionary matter and
without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, look in closets and other spaces from which an
attack could be immediately launched."' (quoting Buie, 494 U.S. at 334)).
21oSee, e.g., State v. Roberts, 957 S.W.2d 449, 454 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (noting that the first
type of Buie search does not require reasonable suspicion).
2 11Buie, 494 U.S. at 334.
212 id.
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What courts have since referred to as the second type of Buie search is a
"protective sweep" of areas beyond the spaces covered by the first type of
Buie search which might "harbor[] an individual posing a danger to those
on the arrest scene."2 13 And, as the Court made clear, this protective sweep
is not an automatic search incident to a lawful arrest but instead similar to
Terry frisks. The Court was quick to point out that a protective sweep is
"not a full search of the premises, but may extend only to a cursory
inspection of those spaces where a person may be found." 2 14 As such, the
sweep must last "no longer than is necessary to dispel the reasonable
suspicion of danger and in any event no longer than it takes to complete the
arrest and depart the premises."2 15 By limiting the protective sweep in these
regards, the Court was able to compare it to a Terry frisk and find that both
"are permissible on less than probable cause only because they are limited
to that which is necessary to protect the safety of officers and others." 2 16
As noted, it is clear that the Court's recognition of this second type of
search-the "protective sweep"-was its holding. In the introduction to its
opinion, the Court indicated that the question before it was what level of
justification is required before arresting officers conduct "the protective
sweep undertaken here," and the answer was reasonable suspicion.2 17 In the
body of its opinion leading up to its two-part holding, the Court analogized
the reasonable suspicion searches in Terry and Long to the case before it,
and immediately after this holding, it noted that it was applying their logic,
requiring "reasonable, individualized suspicion," and rejecting the State's
argument that Detective Frolich needed "no level of objective justification"
before searching the basement.2 18 Later, the Court held that the type of
search which it was authorizing was "decidedly not 'automati[c],' but may
be conducted only when justified by a reasonable, articulable suspicion that
the house is harboring a person posing a danger to those on the arrest
scene." 219  Finally, in its conclusion, the Court indicated that it was
remanding to the Court of Appeals of Maryland so that it could determine
whether Detective Frolich had the reasonable suspicion necessary to
213Id. at 335.
214 id.
21sId. at 335-36.
216Id. at 336 n.3.
21
'Id at 327.
218See id. at 331-34, 334 n.2.
2
"'Id. at 336.
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conduct the subject search. 2 20 Thus, there can be no doubt that the Court
viewed Frolich's search as a protective sweep, the second type of Buie
search, and not the first type of Buie search, a fact confirmed by the Court
of Appeals of Maryland subsequent opinion on remand.22 1
Indeed, the only reference that the Court made to the first type of Buie
search was the first sentence in its two-part holding. The Court never
explained why it was creating the first type of Buie search nor provided any
grounds for its creation. Indeed, the brevity of the majority's conclusory
assertion of the existence of this first type of Buie search made the several
sentences Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion devoted to it comprehensive
by comparison. After Brennan attacked the second type of Buie search, he
found the majority's decision to "allow[] police officers without any
requisite level of suspicion to look into 'closets and other spaces
immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be
immediately launched' . . . equally disquieting."222 Brennan noted the
plausibility of Chimel's twin rationales but found them inapplicable in the
present situation:
I find much less plausible the Court's implicit assumption
today that arrestees are likely to sprinkle hidden allies
throughout the rooms in which they might be arrested.
Hence there is no comparable justification for permitting
arresting officers to presume as a matter of law that they
are threatened by ambush from "immediately adjoining"
spaces.22 3
I. Thornton and Automobile Searches Incident to Lawful Arrests of
Recent Occupants
While Buie thus expanded the scope of home searches conducted in
connection with arrests, the Court's 2004 opinion in Thornton v. United
States further expanded upon the scope of automobile searches incident to
lawful arrests that went even beyond Belton. In Thornton, Officer Deion
220Id. at 337.
221 See 580 A.2d 167, 168 (Md. 1990). On remand, the Court of Appeals of Maryland did not
make any reference to the first type of Buie search. Id. It addressed the subject search as the
second type of Buie search and found that there was reasonable suspicion to conduct the protective
sweep of the basement. See id. at 170.
222Buie, 494 U.S. at 342 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
223 id.
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Nichols observed Marcus Thornton driving a Lincoln Town Car in a
suspicious manner and ran a check on the car's license tags, which revealed
that they were issued to a Chevy two-door.2 24 Before Nichols could pull
Thornton over, however, Thornton pulled into a parking lot and exited his
car.22 5 Nichols thus approached Thornton in the parking lot and eventually
lawfully recovered drugs from Thornton, placed him under arrest,
handcuffed him, and secured him in the back seat of his patrol car.2 2 6
Thereafter, Nichols searched the Lincoln Town Car and uncovered a BryCo
9-millimeter handgun from under the driver's seat.227
Thornton subsequently moved to suppress the handgun, claiming that
Belton only applies "to situations where the officer initiated contact with an
arrestee while he was still an occupant of the car."2 28 The Supreme Court,
in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, disagreed, holding that "[i]n all
relevant aspects, the arrest of a suspect who is next to a vehicle presents
identical concerns regarding officer safety and the destruction of evidence
as the arrest of one who is inside the vehicle." 22 9 According to Rehnquist,
the stress faced by an arresting officer "is no less merely because the
arrestee exited his car before the officer initiated contact, nor is an arrestee
less likely to attempt to lunge for a weapon or to destroy evidence if he is
outside of, but still in control of, the vehicle."230
In finding that Belton applies to automobile searches incident to lawful
arrests of even recent occupants, the majority both acknowledged and
embraced Belton's fiction:
To be sure, not all contraband in the passenger
compartment is likely to be readily accessible to a "recent
occupant." It is unlikely in this case that petitioner could
have reached under the driver's seat for his gun once he
was outside of his automobile. But the firearm and the
passenger compartment in general were no more
inaccessible than were the contraband and the passenger
compartment in Belton. The need for a clear rule, readily
224 541 U.S. 615, 617-18 (2004).
2251Id. at 618.
2261d
2271d.
2281Id. at 618, 619.229Id. at 621.
230id.
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understood by police officers and not depending on
differing estimates of what items were or were not within
reach of an arrestee at any particular moment, justifies the
sort of generalization which Belton enunciated.2 31
Meanwhile, Justice Scalia, along with Justice Ginsburg, concurred in
the judgment.23 2 Justice Scalia noted that in Chimel, the Court had set forth
the twin rationales of searches incident to lawful arrests: protecting officer
233safety and preventing the concealment or destruction of evidence.
According to Scalia, the majority stretched the scope of the search incident
to a lawful arrest beyond its breaking point because the risk that Thornton,
who was already handcuffed and in the patrol car, "would nevertheless
'grab a weapon or evidentiary ite[m]' from his car was remote in the
extreme." 234
Scalia reached this conclusion by raising and rejecting "three reasons
why the search in this case might have been justified to protect officer
safety or prevent concealment or destruction of evidence."23 5 The first
defense of the search was that, "despite being handcuffed and secured in the
back of a squad car, petitioner might have escaped and retrieved a weapon
or evidence from his vehicle."2 36 Scalia disparaged this reason, claiming
that it called to mind the "mythical arrestee 'possessed of the skill of
Houdini and the strength of Hercules' because the government could cite
no examples of such a feat.237 The government did point to seven instances
of handcuffed or formerly handcuffed arrestees attacking officers with
weapons, but none of these instances involved an arrestee retrieving
anything from his vehicle.2 38 According to Scalia, the elusive risk did not
justify the search:
[T]he Government need not document specific instances
in order to justify measures that avoid obvious risks. But
the risk here is far from obvious, and in a context as
frequently recurring as roadside arrests, the Government's
231Id. at 622-23.
2321d. at 625-32 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).233Id. at 625.
234 d.
235id.
2361d. at 625-26.
237 Id. at 626 (quoting United States v. Frick, 490 F.2d 666, 673 (5th Cir. 1973)).
238id.
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inability to come up with even a single example of a
handcuffed arrestee's retrieval of arms or evidence from his
vehicle undermines its claims. The risk that a suspect
handcuffed in the back of a squad car might escape and
recover a weapon from his vehicle is surely no greater than
the risk that a suspect handcuffed in his residence might
escape and recover a weapon from the next room-a
danger we held insufficient to justify a search in Chimel.239
The second defense was that because "the officer could have conducted
the search at the time of arrest (when the suspect was still near the car), he
should not be penalized for having taken the sensible precaution of securing
the suspect in the squad car first." 24 0 Scalia found fault with this defense
because it assumed that the search must take place.2 4 1 He noted that
searches incident to lawful arrests are exceptions (to the search warrant
requirement) rather than the rule and that "[i]f 'sensible police procedures'
require that suspects be handcuffed and put in squad cars, then police
should handcuff suspects, put them in squad cars, and not conduct the
search."24 2
The third defense was the Belton fiction: "that, even though the arrestee
posed no risk here, Belton searches in general are reasonable, and the
benefits of a bright-line rule justify upholding that small minority of
searches that, on their particular facts, are not reasonable." 2 4 3 Scalia noted
that "[t]he validity of this argument rests on the accuracy of Belton's claim
that the passenger compartment is 'in fact generally, even if not inevitably,'
within the suspect's immediate control." 24 And he found that if this claim
were ever true, "it certainly is not true today."245 Instead, Scalia pointed out
that reported cases upholding vehicle searches after officers handcuffed and
secured their occupants were "legion," a point underscored by the
government's own admission that a finding that officers cannot search an
arrestee's vehicle after restraining him would "'largely render Belton a dead
239Id. at 626-27 (citation omitted).
2401Id. at 627.
241 d
242 id.
243 id
244Id. (quoting Belton v. New York, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981)).
2451Id. at 628.
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letter."' 24 6 The popularity of such searches made sense to Scalia because,
"[i]f Belton entitles an officer to search a vehicle upon arresting the driver
despite having taken measures that eliminate any danger, what rational
officer would not take those measures?" 247 But the absence of danger in
these searches made them indefensible to Scalia under Chimel.248
Instead, Scalia found that "[i]f Belton searches are justifiable, it is not
because the arrestee might grab a weapon or evidentiary item from his car,
but simply because the car might contain evidence relevant to the crime for
which he was arrested." 24 9 He then noted that "[t]his more general sort of
evidence-gathering search is not without antecedent," pulling Rabinowitz
and Harris from the scrap heap. 5 0 Scalia found that the Court upheld the
searches in those cases, not based upon either of the Chimel rationales, but
instead based upon "a more general interest in gathering evidence relevant
to the crime for which the suspect had been arrested."2 51 He proffered
"[n]umerous earlier authorities," which supported the types of searched
conducted in Rabinowitz and Harris, and concluded that "[t]here is nothing
irrational about broader police authority to search for evidence when and
where the perpetrator of a crime is lawfully arrested."2 52 Of course, Scalia
also acknowledged that Chimel repudiated these two opinions and that its
"narrower focus on concealment or destruction of evidence also has
historical support." 2 53
As noted above, Scalia found that "Belton cannot reasonably be
explained as a mere application of Chimel," and he also found that
Rabinowitz and Harris were not "so persuasive as to justify departing from
settled law."254 For Scalia, then, the solution was neither to revive
Rabinowitz and Harris generally as defining the proper scope of searches
incident to lawful arrests nor to continue to pile fiction upon fiction;
instead, the answer was honesty. According to Scalia, "if we are going to
continue to allow Belton searches on stare decisis grounds, we should at
246Id.
247Id. (emphasis in original).
248 See id.249Id. at 629.
250 d
251 id.
252 d.
253 Id. at 630.
254Id. at 631.
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least be honest about why we are doing so.",255 And honesty for Scalia
would be the Court acknowledging that Belton "is a return to the broader
sort of search incident to arrest that we allowed before Chimel-limited, of
course, to searches of motor vehicles, a category of 'effects' which give rise
to a reduced expectation of privacy and heightened law enforcement
needs."256 Under this reading of Belton, officers can conduct searches of
vehicles incident to lawfil arrests if, and only if, "it is reasonable to believe
evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle."2 57
J. Back to Reality: Arizona v. Gant and the Dismantling of the
Belton Fiction
Five years later, the Court largely took Scalia up on his offer. In
Arizona v. Gant, officers acted on an anonymous tip that a house was being
used to sell drugs.2 58 Upon arrival, they knocked at the front door and
spoke with Rodney Gant, who told them that he expected the homeowner to
return later.2 59 The officers then left and conducted a records check, "which
revealed that Gant's driver's license had been suspended and [that] there
was an outstanding warrant for his arrest for driving with a suspended
license." 26 0 The officers then returned to the house and arrested a man near
the back of the house for providing a false name and a woman parked in a
car in front of the house for possessing drug paraphernalia.26 1
Subsequently, Gant returned to the house in his car, and officers arrested
him for driving with a suspended license, handcuffed him, locked him in a
patrol car, and searched his car, uncovering cocaine in the pocket of a jacket
on the backseat.26 2 Gant later moved to suppress the drugs, and the
Supreme Court, in a majority opinion by Justice Stevens, agreed, finding
that the search was unconstitutional.26 3 The Court began by noting that
Chimel laid out the scope of a proper search incident to a lawful arrest: "the
arrestee's person and the area 'within his immediate control'-construing
255 d
256Id. (citation omitted).257 1d. at 632.
258 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1714 (2009).
259 1d. at 1714-15.
260 Id. at 1715.
261id.
262 id.
2631Id. at 1715, 1724.
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that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of
a weapon or destructible evidence.",264 Justice Stevens found that this
limiting language, "which continues to define the boundaries of the
exception, ensures that the scope of a search incident to arrest is
commensurate with its purposes of protecting arresting officers and
safeguarding any evidence of the offense of arrest that an arrestee might
conceal or destroy."265 Conversely, "[i]f there is no possibility that an
arrestee could reach into the area that law enforcement officers seek to
search, both justifications for the search-incident-to-arrest exception are
absent and the rule does not apply." 26 6
Justice Stevens found that the subject search fell into the latter
category.267 He noted that Justice Brennan's disparaging reading of Belton
had "predominated," with courts construing it as an entitlement condoning
officers' searches of vehicles after they had arrested and secured their
occupants. 2 6 8  According to Stevens, applying Belton in this manner
"untether[s] the rule from the justifications underlying the Chimel
exception-a result clearly incompatible with our statement in Belton that it
'in no way alters the fundamental principles established in the Chimel
case . . . ."'269 The Court thus "reject[ed] this reading of Belton and h[e]ld
that the Chimel rationale authorizes police to search a vehicle incident to a
recent occupant's arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within
reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the
search." 2 7 0
After this sweeping statement, however, the Court immediately noted
that these were not the only circumstances under which officers can search
the passenger compartment of an arrestee's vehicle incident to his lawful
arrest. Relying upon Justice Scalia's Thornton concurrence, the Court
found that, "[a]lthough it does not follow from Chimel, we also conclude
that circumstances unique to the vehicle context justify a search incident to
a lawful arrest when it is 'reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the
crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle."' 2 7 1 The Court quickly
264Id. at 1716 (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)).265 d
266 d
267Id. at 1719.
268Id. at 1718.
2691d. at 1719.
270Id.
2711Id. (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in
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clarified that "[i]n many cases, as when a recent occupant is arrested for a
traffic violation, there will be no reasonable basis to believe the vehicle
contains relevant evidence."272 Indeed, Justice Stevens found that the
present case was such a case because it involved an arrest for driving with a
suspended license, making the subject search unconstitutional because Gant
was also secured and not within reaching distance of his car's passenger
compartment.2 73
In reaching this conclusion, the Court also rejected the State's
contention "that Belton searches are reasonable regardless of the possibility
of access in a given case because that expansive rule correctly balances law
enforcement interests . .. with an arrestee's limited privacy interest in his
vehicle."274 On the one hand, Stevens found that "the State seriously
undervalue[d] the privacy interests at stake."27 5 He noted that "[a]lthough
we have recognized that a motorist's privacy interest in his vehicle is less
substantial than in his home, the former interest is nevertheless important
and deserving of constitutional protection." 27 6 Accordingly, the problem
with the Belton fiction is that it gave "police the power to conduct . . . a
search whenever an individual is caught committing a traffic offense, when
there is no basis for believing evidence of the offense might be found in the
vehicle, creat[ing] a serious and recurring threat to the privacy of countless
individuals."2 77
On the other hand, Stevens concluded that, "[c]ontrary to the State's
suggestion, a broad reading of Belton is also unnecessary to protect law
enforcement safety and evidentiary interests." 2 78  Stevens reached this
conclusion because "[o]ther established exceptions to the warrant
requirement authorize a vehicle search under additional circumstances when
safety or evidentiary concerns demand." 2 79
Specifically, Stevens noted that "Michigan v. Long permits an officer to
search a vehicle's passenger compartment when he has reasonable
suspicion that an individual, whether or not the arrestee, is 'dangerous' and
judgment)).
272 Id.
273id.
274Id. at 1720.
275 id
276Id. (citations omitted).
277 id.
2781Id. at 1721.
2791d.
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might access the vehicle to 'gain immediate control of weapons."' 280
Moreover, he found that under the automobile exception, officers with
probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains evidence of criminal
activity can search "any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be
found." 2 8 1 Stevens also suggested that "there may be still other
circumstances in which safety or evidentiary interests would justify a
search," citing Buie and its holding that "incident to arrest, an officer may
conduct a limited protective sweep of those areas of a house in which he
reasonably suspects a dangerous person may be hiding."28 2
Ironically, while Justice Scalia's Thornton concurrence was ostensibly
the impetus for the majority opinion, Scalia begrudgingly concurred with
the majority in Gant in an opinion that clearly showed his dissatisfaction
with its central holding. Scalia, of course, agreed with the majority that
officers should be able to search a vehicle's passenger compartment
incident to a lawful arrest when it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant
to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle. 2 83 But according to
Scalia, this adopted Rabinowitz-Harris evidence-gathering rationale is the
only support for such a search, and the Court "should simply abandon the
Belton-Thornton charade of officer safety and overrule those cases." 2 84
However, Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kennedy, and
Breyer were wholly unconvinced. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Alito
criticized many of the majority's conclusions, including its assertion that a
broad reading of Belton was unnecessary to protect law enforcement
285
safety. According to the dissenting Justices, the Court was insouciant to
two situations where neither existing exceptions nor the Court's
construction of Belton would authorize a vehicle search despite safety
concerns so demanding:
First, it is not uncommon for an officer to arrest some but
not all of the occupants of a vehicle. . . . Second, there may
be situations in which an arresting officer has cause to fear
that persons who were not passengers in the car might
attempt to retrieve a weapon or evidence from the car while
2801d.
281Id. (citation omitted).
282 d
283Id. at 1725 (Scalia, J., concurring).
284Id.
285See id. at 1729 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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the officer is still on the scene.286
III. THE BROAD READING OF SUSPICIOUSLESs BuE SEARCHES
As previously noted, in Maryland v. Buie the Court authorized two
types of searches. First, the Court in Buie found that "as an incident to [an]
arrest the officers c[an], as a precautionary matter and without probable
cause or reasonable suspicion, look in closets or other spaces immediately
adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately
launched." 287 Second, Buie authorized "protective sweeps" beyond those
spaces covered by the first type of search, but only when "there [are]
articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from
those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the
area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest
scene," 288 i.e., reasonable suspicion.
As noted, the Court's creation of this second type of search was the
controlling portion of its opinion while its reference to the first type of
search was dictum. But while the Court merely made passing reference to
this first type of search in dictum, as will be seen in the following
paragraphs, federal and state courts across the country have treated it as
gospel. Indeed, the fact that the first type of Buie search was dictum has
only been mentioned in one opinion addressing the merits of Buie.289 In
State v. Dawson, an appellant claimed that the first type of Buie search, like
the second type of Buie search, should require reasonable suspicion because
the conclusion in Buie that the former search did not require such suspicion
was dictum.2 90 The Court of Appeals of Washington quickly disposed of
this argument, concluding that "many federal and state cases cite Buie for
both standards."2 9'
Indeed, courts nationwide have read Buie as well as Michigan v.
Summers and its progeny as authorization cases, permitting officers at
286Id. at 1731 n.2.
287 Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990).
288 d.
289United States v. McQuagge, 787 F. Supp. 637, 655 (E.D. Tex. 1991). In United States v.
McQuagge, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas noted that the
Court's recognition of the first type of search in Buie was dictum, but this finding was itself
dictum as the court's opinion addressed the constitutionality of the search of a van. Id
29No. 26360-6-III, 2008 WL 4411539, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2008).
291 Id. at *34.
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suspects' homes (and sometimes other locations) to conduct warrantless
searches or seizures under certain circumstances.292 In Michigan v.
Summers, the Court concluded that a search warrant per se carries with it
the limited authority for officers to detain the occupants of the premises
while a proper search is conducted.2 93 Moreover, "[a]lthough Summers
dealt with the execution of a search warrant, several courts have
persuasively extended its application to the execution of arrest warrants,
holding that the same law enforcement interests are applicable in both
,,294
scenarios. In other words, under Summers and its progeny, officers can
per se seize other occupants while executing search or arrest warrants.
Meanwhile, under the first type of Buie search, arresting officers can
automatically search for and seize other occupants. And as cases from
across the country make clear, courts have construed this latter entitlement
broadly.
First, courts universally have held that arresting officers can conduct the
first type of Buie search without even reasonable suspicion of danger and
that such searches need not be limited to the boundary laid out in Chimel-
the area from within which the arrestee might gain possession of a weapon
or destructible evidence.2 95 For instance, in United States v. Charles, Chief
Brannon Decou received an anonymous tip that Bernard Charles was
storing narcotics in a storage facility. 29 6 Decou then learned that Charles
was the subject of several outstanding warrants, most for traffic violations,
and proceeded with Sergeant Darryl Vernon and Chief Deputy Timothy
Picard, without a search warrant, to Charles' storage unit to conduct
surveillance.2 97 Charles eventually arrived, and just as he entered the
storage unit, the officers identified themselves, prompting Charles to drop
an envelope into an open convertible in the storage unit.29 8 The officers
then arrested Charles on his outstanding warrants "just at the entrance to the
292See Daniel L. Rotenberg, An Essay on the Unexpected Person Factor in Searches and
Seizures, 39 ST. Louis U. L.J. 505, 511-12 (1995).
293See 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981).
294 United States v. Werra, No. 06-10414-DPW, 2008 WL 4280035, at *7 (D. Mass. Sept. 11,
2008).
295 See, e.g., United States v. McQuagge, 787 F. Supp. 637, 655 (E.D. Tex. 1991).
Interestingly, in McQuagge, the Eastern District of Texas found that the first type of Buie search
only covers the arrest room and not any other room, but again, this was in dictum. Id.
296469 F.3d 402, 404 (5th Cir. 2006).
297 1d.
298 Id.
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open storage unit, which measured approximately 10 feet wide and 25 feet
deep."2 99 Specifically, the arrest was conducted with Charles being
"ordered out of the unit onto the ground, where he was arrested without
incident." 3 00
Then, "[a]s Charles was being read his Miranda rights and escorted to a
police cruiser, Picard entered the unit and checked inside, under, and around
the convertible to ensure that there were no other occupants in the unit. 301
In the convertible, Picard noticed that the "now open" envelope contained
crack cocaine.302 Picard also uncovered "a partially disassembled firearm
on top of a cardboard box in the corner of the storage unit."30 3 Charles
thereafter moved to suppress this evidence, claiming that the officers "could
have had no 'reasonable suspicion' that any other individuals were present
in the storage unit."304 The district court disagreed, and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, concluding that "[u]nder
Buie, Officer Picard's cursory sweep of the unit immediately adjacent to the
site of the arrest was permissible, even without probable cause or
reasonable suspicion." 305
Furthermore, courts have not limited the first type of Buie search to the
arrest room. Instead, they universally have upheld searches of sufficiently
large spaces in rooms immediately abutting arrest rooms and connected to
306
arrest rooms by hallways. As an example, in State v. Roberts, Matthew
Roberts' neighbor called 911 and informed authorities that Roberts had
been beating his dog and that he thought Roberts had killed the dog. 30 7
Sergeant Schopfer and Officers Charles Iseman and Anthony Hunter
arrived without a search warrant about three and a half hours later at
Roberts' duplex and arrested him in a rear bedroom, with Iseman
2991d at 405.
Id. at 404.
301d
302 d
303 id.
304Id. at 405.
30sId. at 406.
106 See, e.g., United States v. Brookshire, No. 1:07-CR-92-TS, 2009 WL 57530, at *6 (N.D.
Ind. Jan. 8, 2009) (citing cases that exemplify this concept); State v. Koziol, No. 23188-7111, 2005
WL 2502177, at *4 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 2005) (citing several cases for the proposition that
"the immediately adjoining area may extend to a back bedroom in a small apartment, adjoining
bedroom in a house, or mobile home bedroom").
307957 S.W.2d 449, 450 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
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handcuffing Roberts and Roberts admitting that his dog died while he was
squeezing it.3 0 Thereafter, while Schopfer kept watch on Roberts, Iseman
and Hunter searched a bathroom connected to the bedroom, a hallway
closet, living room areas, and the kitchen that were about seven to fifteen
feet away from the bedroom and connected to it by a hallway.30 9 These
searches uncovered evidence connected to the death of the dog as well as a
marijuana plant, and Roberts moved to suppress this evidence, claiming that
there had been an unlawful search and seizure without a search warrant.310
The trial court granted Roberts' motion, and the State appealed.3 1' The
court found that the search could be constitutional as a type one Buie search
if the spaces searched immediately adjoined the place of arrest and if the
search was quick and limited to places where a person could be hiding.3 12
In resolving this issue in favor of the government, the court noted that
"[a]lthough the phrase 'immediately adjoining the place of arrest from
which an attack could be immediately launched' is not defined in Buie,
other courts have interpreted the phrase as including rooms directly adjacent
to the place of arrest."3 13
In two subsequent cases, other courts have come to similar conclusions.
In United States v. Lay, Curtis Lay was arrested at the front door of his
apartment, and the distance from the front door to his bedroom was fifteen
feet, with the two being separated by the living room and a hallway.3 14 The
Fourth Circuit found that Lay's bedroom constituted a space adjoining the
place of arrest, rendering constitutional an officer's warrantless entry into
that bedroom and his suspicionless search of an internally partitioned
locker, which uncovered crack cocaine and baggies. 3 15 In United States v.
Sanchez, officers arrested and handcuffed Jaime Sanchez in his living room
before searching "the adjoining kitchen, the three closets in the hallway off
the living room, the bathroom, and the sole bedroom." 3 16 In the last of the
three closets, approximately fifteen feet from the place of arrest, an officer
uncovered a shotgun which the United States District Court for the
osId. at 450-51
09Id. at 451, 454.
310Id. at 451.
311Id. at 450.
31 1Id. at 454.
311Id. at 453.
314No. 98-4300, 1999 WL 436431, at *1, *2 (4th Cir. June 29, 1999).
315Id.
316No. 98 CR. 1480(DLC), 1999 WL 138924, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 1999).
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Southern District of New York refused to suppress, concluding that even
though the officers lacked reasonable suspicion or a warrant, they only
searched areas immediately adjoining the place of arrest. 317 Of course, the
court also could have had several other cases in mind, including cases
authorizing searches of locked rooms connected to arrest rooms by
hallways.
Courts have even found that there is no problem with arresting officers
searching the entirety of small houses or apartments as part of type one Buie
searches. For instance, in United States v. Thomas, five Deputy U.S.
Marshals executed an arrest warrant for Anthony Thomas at his apartment
and arrested him in the hallway immediately inside the front door. 319 The
Deputy Marshals then proceeded to search the rest of the apartment's
rooms: a kitchen, bedroom, and bathroom which were all connected to the
hallway. 32 0 In the bedroom, which was fifteen feet from the entrance to the
apartment, Deputy Marshal William Martin and a colleague searched an
open closet and the space under a bed.321 On the top shelf of the closet, on
top of a stack of clothes, they uncovered a handgun and a shotgun shell,
and, at the bottom of the closet, under a "big bulked up blanket or
comforter" which was approximately three feet high and which Martin
claimed "a person could easily have fit underneath," they uncovered an
assault rifle and shotgun.322 Thomas moved to suppress this evidence,
claiming that the spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest "included
at most the living room, and the front hallway" because "[o]therwise, in a
small apartment ... the 'police would be entitled to sweep the entire
premises without a showing of reasonable suspicion. ,,323 The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia disagreed:
If an apartment is small enough that all of it "immediately
adjoin[s] the place of arrest" and all of it constitutes a space
or spaces "from which an attack could be immediately
launched," then the entire apartment is subject to a limited
"Id. at *1-2.
318 See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 775 F. Supp. 231, 232, 235 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
3 "429 F.3d 282, 284-85 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
320 Id. at 285.
"' Id. at 284-85.
322 Id. at 285.
121 Id. at 285, 287.
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sweep of spaces where a person may be found.324
In reaching this conclusion, the court found that "Thomas' concept of
the place of arrest [wa]s unreasonably narrow" and that he could "point[] to
no case where the place of arrest has been defined more narrowly than the
entirety of the room in which the arrest occurred." 3 25 Other courts also have
found no problem with arresting officers searching entire houses or
apartments during type one Buie searches.32 6
Indeed, litigants have been universally unable to point to precedent in
which courts construed the "spaces immediately adjoining the place of
arrest" as solely limited to spaces in the room where the arrest occurred. In
State v. Koziol, Deputy Tom Manthei and Reserve Deputy Justin Brunson
executed arrest warrants at the mobile home of Joseph Koziol, eventually
arresting him in the living room.327 Thereafter, Manthei walked down a
hallway that was approximately thirty-five feet long and searched the
master bedroom and adjoining bathroom before returning to the living room
and walking down a second hallway that was approximately ten feet long
and searching a second bedroom. 3 28  The searches uncovered a
methamphetamine laboratory, and Koziol moved to suppress this evidence,
claiming that the spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest "should
be limited to the room where the arrest occurred."329 The trial court denied
that motion, and, on Koziol's appeal, the Court of Appeals of Washington
affirmed, concluding that Koziol did "not provide any authority that
support[ed] this position" and that "[t]he doctrine has not previously been
applied this narrowly."3 30
It is not surprising that Koziol was unable to point to any case that
construed the "spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest" as only
those spaces in the room of arrest. This author was unable to locate a single
case where a court has invalidated a search in rooms adjoining the arrest
room, or connected to it by a hallway, as long as the officers only searched
324Id. at 287-88 (quoting Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990)).
3251Id. at 287.
326 See, e.g., United States v. Brookshire, No. 1:07-CR-92-TS, 2009 WL 57530, at *3, *6
(N.D. Ind. Jan. 8, 2009); United States v. Williams, No. 07-30029-01, 2008 WL 1712291, at *2,
*4--5 (W.D. La. Feb. 5, 2008); State v. Hicks, 3 So. 3d 539, 546 (La. Ct. App. 2008).
327No. 23188-7-III, 2005 WL 2502177, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 2005).
3281d. at *1, *2.
319Id. at *2, *4.
3301d. at *4.
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spaces from which an attack could be immediately launched. Indeed, so
well established is this broad construction of the first type of Buie search
that many defendants and appellants have begun to not even dispute the
government's ability to conduct them. For example, in United States v.
Mendoza, four to five officers arrested Jose Mendoza in the living area of
his home, and at least two of the officers then searched a bedroom in the
adjoining hallway, in which they found an older couple sleeping, prompting
them to conduct a protective sweep of the other bedrooms.3 3  During the
protective sweep, the officers found two rifles and ammunition.33 2
Mendoza filed a motion to suppress, but that motion only addressed the
alleged unconstitutionality of the officers' subsequent protective sweep of
the other bedrooms; as the motion stated, "Mendoza d[id] not argue that
police were not entitled to enter the first [bed]room."3 33 Similarly, other
defendants and appellants have begun to concede that arresting officers can
conduct suspicionless searches of rooms connected to arrest rooms by
hallways.3 34
Litigants do continue to contend that officers executing the first type of
Buie search exceed the scope of such a search by exploring spaces from
which an attack could not be immediately launched, but they have been
largely unsuccessful, as courts generally have defined such spaces broadly.
As previously noted, in United States v. Thomas, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia saw no problem with a type one Buie
search in which an arresting officer searched under a "big bulked up blanket
or comforter," which was approximately three feet high.3 As another
example, in United States v. McLemore, Police Officers John Miltotzky and
John McDermott, as well as backup officers executed arrest warrants for
Takiesha Haynes and Cartell McLemore at an apartment belonging to
McLemore, eventually arresting and handcuffing Haynes in the living
room.336 Then, despite Milotzky admittedly "not hear[ing] anything that
would lead him to believe that someone else was in the apartment," a
backup officer, McDermott, and he searched each room in the apartment,
3
'
3 333 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1158, 1160 (D. Utah 2004).
332Id. at 1158.
333 Id. at 1160.
33See, e.g., United States v. Goree, 365 F.3d 1086, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (noting that the
appellant did not dispute that arresting officers properly searched rooms connected to the arrest
room by hallways under the first type ofBuie search).
3'429 F.3d 282, 285, 287-88 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
33
'No. 05-CR-266, 2006 WL 572353, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 7, 2006).
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including a southwest bedroom connected to the living room by a hallway
that "was approximately seven or eight feet away from where Haynes was
placed under arrest in the living room."337
In one corner of the southwest bedroom, there was a bowl-shaped chair,
and in another corner, there was a pile of laundry, which Milotzky
described as "approximately three feet high and two feet wide."33 8
Milotzky searched the bedroom, including the pile of laundry and the area
behind the chair, uncovering, among other things, a firearm.339 McLemore
moved to suppress the evidence found during the search, and Milotzky
claimed that someone could have been hiding behind the chair and that "it
was possible for someone to conceal themselves with the pile of
laundry." 340 McLemore countered, inter alia, "that Milotzky's testimony
that a person could have concealed themselves behind the bowl-shaped
chair, or under the pile of laundry [wa]s implausible."34 1 Magistrate Judge
Callahan, of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin, disagreed:
I can not [sic] say that it was unreasonable for the officers
to believe that a person might have been hiding behind the
bowl-shaped chair or under the pile of laundry. Indeed, the
defendant's argument that the officers need not look behind
a chair, under a pile of laundry, or inside a closet does not
comport with the underlying rationale for the protective
sweep exception-that officers should be able to ensure
their safety when lawfully entering a private dwelling.342
Other courts similarly have upheld Buie searches of relatively small
spaces.343
Some courts have even held that both varieties of Buie searches "need
not be incident to an arrest." 344 In Clark v. Webster, drug enforcement
331Id. at *3, *6.
338Id. at *2-4.
339Id. at *3-4.
3401Id. at *1, *3, *8.
31I.at *8.
342 id
3 See, e.g., United States v. Lauter, 57 F.3d 212, 214, 217 (2d Cir. 1995) (upholding a Buie
search of the three foot area between a mattress and a wall in a room that only contained the
mattress and the nightstand).
34Clark v. Webster, 384 F. Supp. 2d 371, 382 (D. Me. 2005).
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agent Steven Webster suspected that Sara Clark was trafficking in
marijuana and believed that his suspicion blossomed into probable cause
when he went to Clark's condominium and questioned her at its doorway.34 5
Webster thereafter told Clark that he was securing the condo while he
waited for a search warrant and gave her the option to stay outside or go
inside with Officers Douglas Taft and Bernie King.34 6 Clark chose the latter
option and proceeded to the couch in her living room. 347 Thereafter, the
officers searched not only the living room, but also the adjoining kitchen
and the condo's closet, bathroom, bedroom, and laundry room, which were
"all connected to the living room by a short hallway." 34 8 The United States
District Court for the District of Maine found these searches constitutional,
citing three federal appellate court opinions for the proposition that Buie
searches are permissible when exigent circumstances prompt the entry of
police, even in the absence of an arrest.34 9
IV. ARIZONA V. GANT INVALIDATES SUSPICIONLESS BUIE SEARCHES
A. Introduction
As previously noted, Chimel marked the end of the nearly two decade
reign of Harris, Rabinowitz, and the broad construction of the search
incident to a lawful arrest.3 50 However, consistent with the inconsistent
history of the exception, the Court soon began expanding the proper scope
of searches incident to lawful arrests in its post-Chimel opinions in Belton,
Buie, and Thornton. 35  In Arizona v. Gant, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
Chimel as defining the proper scope of searches incident to lawful arrests,
explicitly overruled the predominating reading of Belton, and rejected
Thornton as an application of Chimel.352  This section argues that
defendants and appellants should be able to raise both the Arizona v. Gant
opinion and the reasoning within it to argue that the reaffirmation of Chimel
3451d. at 374-75.
3461d. at 375.
347 d.
348Id. at 382-83.
349Id. at 382 (citing United States v. Jimenez, 419 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v.
Martins, 413 F.3d 139 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Taylor, 248 F.3d 506 (6th Cir. 2001)).
350 See supra notes 113-36 and accompanying text.
351 See supra notes 149-69, 182-257 and accompanying text.
3s2See supra notes 258-82 and accompanying text.
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and the destruction of the Belton fiction together invalidate the first type of
Buie's search. This section also argues that, even without Gant, courts
should have realized and should now conclude that they have grossly
misconstrued the scope of the first type of Buie search.
B. How Courts Erred in Construing the Scope of Suspicionless Buie
Searches
As will be noted infra," courts should read the Supreme Court's
opinion in Arizona v. Gant as invalidating the first type of Buie search.
Nevertheless, even if courts do not read Gant in this manner, it is clear even
without Gant that courts have stretched the scope of this type of search
incident to lawful arrest beyond its breaking point and need to correct their
errors. As noted, the Court in Maryland v. Buie found that "as an incident
to the arrest the officers could, as a precautionary matter and without
probable cause or reasonable suspicion, look in closets and other spaces
immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be
immediately launched."3 54 This passage prompted at least three questions:
(1) Is an arrest an absolute prerequisite for a Buie search; (2) from what
spaces can an attack immediately be launched; and (3) what spaces
immediately adjoin the place of arrest. Some courts have erred in
answering the first two questions while all courts have erred in answering
the third.
1. Buie Searches Cannot Be Justified Unless Preceded by Lawful
Arrests
In Robinson, the Court made clear that under the search incident to a
lawful arrest exception, "[i]t is the fact of the lawful arrest which
establishes the authority to search . . ."3 This opinion in turn explained
the Court's subsequent conclusion in Knowles v. Iowa that a lawful arrest
is, as the name of the exception makes clear, the sine qua non of a search
incident to a lawful arrest.3 5 6 Indeed, with one exception, courts have
151 See infra Part IV.C.
354494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990).
.. sUnited States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
56See 525 U.S. 113, 117-18 (1998).
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respected this Supreme Court precedent.357 This one exception turns on
courts' application of Buie. As noted, in Clark v. Webster, the United
States District Court for the District of Maine relied on three federal
appellate court opinions in deeming constitutional a type one Buie search
that was conducted without an arrest. 35 8 Under Robinson and Knowles,
these opinions are indefensible, and courts in the future should respect
Supreme Court precedent and find that any searches conducted without
lawful arrests cannot be justified under Buie.
2. Spaces from Which an Attack Could Immediately Be
Launched Only Include Spaces Large Enough to Conceal
Persons
The Court made clear that type one Buie searches can only extend to
"closets and other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from
which an attack could be immediately launched." 35 9 Earlier in its opinion, it
had defined these spaces as "those places in which a person might be
hiding."360 Reconciling the Court's language in Buie with the broad way
that many courts have defined these spaces is difficult.
In United States v. Lauter, Special ATF agents arrested Phillip Lauter in
a basement apartment but did not have a search warrant covering that
apartment.361 Agents arrested Lauter in the front room of the apartment,
and Agent Graham eventually entered the apartment's small back room,
which "contained only a nightstand and a queen-size mattress on a metal
frame standing roughly three inches off the ground, with approximately
three feet between the bed and the wall on either side of the bed." 3 62
Graham looked in an open drawer in the night stand and seized from it a
bag of ammunition. 363 He also looked to the left of the bed, saw the stock
of a shotgun protruding from underneath the mattress, seized the shotgun,
357See, e.g., Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005) ("We decline to
extend the doctrine of 'search incident to arrest' to give protection for a warrantless search or
seizure when no arrest is made.").
35s 384 F. Supp. 2d 371, 382 (D. Me. 2005).
359Buie, 494 U.S. at 334.
a
6
"od. at 327.
36157 F.3d 212, 213 (2d Cir. 1995).
362Id. at 213-14.
361Id. at 214.
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and looked under the bed.3 64 Lauter moved to suppress the evidence that
Graham found in the room, but the Second Circuit denied his motion,
finding that "[a]side from looking in the drawer, the fruits of which search
were not introduced into evidence, Graham's conduct was well within the
scope of a permissible [type one Buie search] .... 365
This broad reading of Buie is consistent with some of the opinions
already mentioned. As previously noted, in United States v. McLemore, the
Eastern District of Wisconsin found no problem with a type one Buie search
in which an officer searched, inter alia, under a pile of laundry which the
officer himself described as "approximately three feet high and two feet
wide."3 66 Moreover, three appears to be the magic number because, as
noted, in United States v. Thomas, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia found no problem with a Deputy Marshal's search
under a "big bulked up blanket or comforter" which was approximately
three feet high.367 That court even implied that it might allow searches of
smaller spaces:
If an apartment is small enough that all of it "immediately
adjoin[s] the place of arrest" and all of it constitutes a space
or spaces "from which an attack could be immediately
launched," then the entire apartment is subject to a limited
sweep of spaces where a person may be found. 6
Even taking the officers in these cases at their words and giving these
courts every benefit of the doubt, the idea that a two by three foot pile of
laundry or the three inch space under a mattress might constitute spaces in
which persons could be hiding and ready to launch an immediate attack is
unpalatable. Moreover, the Court in Buie noted that the type of search it
was authorizing was "narrowly confined to a cursory visual inspection of
those places in which a person might be hiding."369 It is questionable that
such a narrowly confined, cursory visual inspection would have uncovered
the shotgun under the mattress in Lauter. Additionally, there appears to be
no way that the courts in McLemore and Thomas could have concluded that
the officers' searches in those cases under the blanket and under the pile of
36Id.
"
6 Id. at 217.
166No. 05-CR-266, 2006 WL 572353, at *3, *6 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 7, 2006).
67 429 F.3d 282, 285, 287 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 287-88 (quoting Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990)).
369See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990).
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laundry constituted narrowly confined, cursory visual inspections.
3. Rooms Connected to the Arrest Room by Hallways Do Not
Immediately Adjoin the Place of Arrest
As previously noted, courts universally have construed the phrase
"spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest" as including sufficiently
large spaces in rooms connected to arrest rooms by hallways. 3 70  This
reading is problematic for two reasons. First, as noted, the Court in Buie
found that Detective Frolich's search of the basement was a protective
sweep, the second type of Buie search, and not a type one Buie search.371
Frolich conducted this search after Corporal Rozar arrested Buie at the top
of the staircase to the basement, with Frolich spotting the incriminatory red
running suit in plain view.372 If a basement connected to the arrest room by
a staircase does not constitute a space immediately adjoining the place of
arrest, how can courts construe rooms connected to arrest rooms by
hallways as long as fifteen373 or even thirty-five feet3 74 as spaces
immediately adjoining the place of arrest? Courts could potentially have
good reasons for distinguishing hallways from staircases, but, as of yet,
they have not articulated them.
Even if they could, however, the second problem with these readings of
the phrase "immediately adjoining" is that they are inconsistent with the
manner in which those same courts have construed the words "immediately
adjoining" in other opinions. Courts most typically have construed the
words "immediately adjoining" in opinions dealing with insurance policies.
For instance, in United States v. Great American Indemnity Co. of New
York, a customer fell in a building owned by the United States, which
"required each individual tenant to secure insurance for the particular space
occupied." 375 The building was "divided into two separate parts by a solid
brick wall."376 On the east side of the wall, on the ground floor, was a
grocery store, and "in the west portion of the building on a mezzanine floor
entirely separated from the stores occupying the street [wa]s a beauty
370 See supra notes 306-18 and accompanying text.
See Buie, 494 U.S. at 327.
311Id. at 328.
See supra notes 309, 314, 317, 321 and accompanying text.
374See supra note 328 and accompanying text.
37'214 F.2d 17, 18 (9th Cir. 1954).376 id.
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shop... ."7 After patronizing the beauty shop, a customer went down a
stairway to the ground floor, "left the building and fell on the sidewalk at a
point two or three feet in front of the entrance to the mezzanine stairway,"
"several feet west of the nearest corner of the grocery store" and "35 feet
west of the nearest entrance to the grocery store... "378
The customer sued and recovered a judgment against the United States,
prompting it to seek indemnity from the beauty shop and grocery store.379
The two businesses then brought motions for summary judgment, claiming
that their insurance policies did not cover the site of the accident, and the
district court granted their motions, leading to an appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.380 The beauty shop's insurance
policy provided as follows: "'Premises-The unqualified word 'premises'
wherever used in this policy shall mean the premises designated in Item 4
of the declarations including buildings and structures thereon and the ways
immediately adjoining."'38  The grocery store's policy was similar and
contained the same "immediately adjoining" language, and the Ninth
Circuit found that the customer's "fall did not occur in any part of the
premises occupied by the grocery store or the beauty shop." 3 82 Therefore,
the court found that it had to resolve whether the customer fell "on a way
'immediately adjoining' either or both premises[.]" 3 83
In answering this question, the Ninth Circuit found "no necessity to
invoke the familiar rule that ambiguities in an insurance policy must be
resolved against the insurer."3 84 The court explained its position:
The words "immediately adjoining" are unequivocal and
have a definite and certain meaning. "Adjoining" used in
its usual and ordinary sense means touching or contiguous,
in contact with, as distinguished from lying near or
adjacent. The words "adjacent" and "adjoining" are
sometimes incorrectly used interchangeably to mean lying
close to or near. But when "adjoining" is coupled with the
3771d.
171Id. at 18-19.
3
1
9 Id. at 18.
380 d.
381 Id. (emphasis in original).
as2Id.
38s Id.
314Id. at 18-19.
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word "immediately", unquestionably the word is used, as
here, in its most restrictive sense.38 5
This meant that the grocery store's insurance policy was inapplicable
because "[t]he restrictive words 'ways immediately adjoining' embrace[d]
at most that portion of the sidewalk abutting or touching the grocery
store."3 86 Thus, "[t]he place of the fall being several feet west of the nearest
corner of the grocery store, it was not within the terms of the policy."m It
also meant that the beauty shop's insurance policy was inapplicable.38 8
According to the court, "[w]hile the entryway and the hall immediately
outside the beauty shop may well be included in the phrase 'ways
immediately adjoining', it would be totally unreasonable to say that
coverage extended down the stairway and out onto the sidewalk." 89
Similarly, in Rodriguez v. American Restaurant Ventures, Inc., Posa
Posa operated a restaurant in a mall, which had rules and regulations
requiring that tenants "keep '[t]he outside areas immediately adjoining the
premises .. . clean and free from snow, ice, dirt and rubbish ... ."'390 After
Louis and Nancy Rodriguez ate dinner at this restaurant, "they left the
restaurant and crossed a brick sidewalk, which r[an] along the front of the
mall's stores, to two steps leading down to the mall's parking lot."3 9 1 Louis
slipped and fell on the steps, and the couple sued, inter alia, Posa Posa,
which moved for summary judgment.39 2 The United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York granted that motion, finding that
"[t]he steps in question do not immediately adjoin the restaurant; instead,
they are separated from the restaurant's premises by the brick sidewalk,
which is approximately eight to ten feet wide."393 Moreover, other courts
have similarly interpreted the phrase "immediately adjoining" in this
narrow sense.3 94
385Id. at 19 (citations omitted).
386id.
3871id.
388 id.
3891d.
390923 F. Supp. 598, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
391 id.
392 id.
393Id. at 601.
394 See, e.g., Caribou Four Corners, Inc. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 443 F.2d 796, 800 (10th Cir.
1971).
54 [Vol. 62:1
HeinOnline  -- 62 Baylor L. Rev. 54 2010
STRANGER THAN DICTUM
In other words, in construing insurance policies, courts have construed
the words "immediately adjoining" as covering, at most, spaces touching or
contiguous with the insured premises. According to these courts, even
spaces "several feet west" from insured premises or separated from such
premises by an eight to ten foot sidewalk do not immediately adjoin those
premises.39 5 Perhaps even more importantly, these courts have found these
words to be unequivocal and unsusceptible to a broader reading.396
Amazingly, courts have read these exact same words in a directly
antithetical manner in upholding type one Buie searches. Courts have
upheld type one Buie searches even when they extend from the arrest room
and down hallways as long as fifteen3 9 7 or even thirty-five feet3 98 into
separate rooms, construing these rooms to be spaces immediately adjoining
the place of arrest. Indeed, on several occasions, courts have even upheld
type one Buie searches when they extend from arrest rooms down hallways,
into separate rooms, and into closets 399 and bathrooms 400 adjoining those
separate rooms. These rulings make no sense given that the first type of
Buie search authorized the search of "closets and other spaces immediately
adjoining the place of arrest . .. ."40 Even if rooms connected to arrest
rooms could be considered spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest,
closets or bathrooms connected to those rooms would not be "spaces
immediately adjoining" the place of arrest.
4. Suspicionless Buie Searches Were Never Meant to Extend
Beyond the Arrest Room
Even if the words "immediately adjoining" by themselves did not
unambiguously signal the invalidity of courts approving type one Buie
searches extending down hallways and into other rooms, the Buie opinion
itself clearly supports such a conclusion. Indeed, the Buie opinion makes
clear that, contrary to what every court has since found, type one Buie
searches cannot constitutionally extend beyond the arrest room and into any
other room, whether it be a room connected to the arrest room by a hallway
395See supra notes 387, 393 and accompanying text.
396 See supra notes 385, 393 and accompanying text.
397See supra notes 309, 314, 317, 321 and accompanying text.
398 See supra note 328 and accompanying text.
399See supra note 321 and accompanying text.
400See supra note 328 and accompanying text.
401 Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990).
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or a room that actually touches, or is contiguous with, the arrest room.
As previously noted, while the Court in Buie authorized two types of
searches, its creation of the "protective sweep," the second type of Buie
search, was the controlling portion of its opinion.402 To reiterate, the Court
in Maryland v. Buie found that Detective Frolich's post-arrest search of
Buie's basement was literally not warranted (under the arrest warrant)
because once Buie "was found. . . the search for him was over, and there
was no longer that particular justification for entering any rooms that had
not yet been searched." 4 0 3 The Court then immediately noted, however, that
the fact "[t]hat Buie had an expectation of privacy in those remaining areas
of his house ... d[id] not mean such rooms were immune from entry."404
Subsequently, the Court acknowledged "that entering rooms not examined
prior to the arrest is [not] a de minimis intrusion that may be disregarded,"
but it found that "arresting officers are permitted in such circumstances to
take reasonable steps to ensure their safety after, and while making, an
arrest." 40 5
This analysis was followed by the Court's two part holding. First, in
dictum, the Court held "that as an incident to the arrest the officers could, as
a precautionary matter and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion,
look in closets and other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest
from which an attack could be immediately launched." 4 06 Second, in the
controlling portion of its opinion, the Court found that "[b]eyond
that ... there must be articulable facts which, taken together with the
rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent
officer in believing that the area swept harbors an individual posing a
danger to those on the arrest scene."4 07 The Court immediately made clear
the fact that this second type of Buie search was the controlling portion of
its opinion (and that the first type of Buie search was not) in the
accompanying footnote, which rejected the State's contention that Detective
Frolich's search required "no level of objective justification" and applied
Terry's requirement of reasonable suspicion "to the protective sweep of a
house."408
402See supra notes 209-21 and accompanying text.
40 3 See Buie, 494 U.S. at 333.
404 Id.
405Id. at 333-34.
406 id.
407 Id.
408Id. at 334 n.2.
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The Court's words compel the conclusion that the first type of Buie
search can never extend beyond the arrest room and into any other room for
a few reasons. First, the Court needed to create the second type of Buie
search, the protective sweep, because, in the Court's own words, after the
arrest, Detective Frolich no longer had "particular justification for entering
any rooms that had not yet been searched."4 09 Moreover, the Court rejected
the government's "no level of objective justification" argument and applied
Terry's reasonable suspicion requirement to protective sweeps based upon
its acknowledgement "that entering rooms not examined prior to the arrest
is [not] a de minimis intrusion that may be disregarded." 410  Because
protective sweeps cover those areas "beyond" the scope of type one Buie
searches, and because protective sweeps cover any rooms beyond the arrest
room, it is clear that type one Buie searches can never extend beyond the
411
arrest room.
Second, the Court in Buie meant for the word "area" to be synonymous
with the word "room." As noted, the Court held that the fact "[tihat Buie
had an expectation of privacy in those remaining areas of his
house . .. d[id] not mean such rooms were immune from entry." By
juxtaposing the phrases "remaining areas" and "such rooms" in this
sentence, the Court made clear that it meant for the two words to be
interchangeable. Then, by later finding that arresting officers can conduct
the second type of Buie search beyond the spaces covered by the first type
of Buie search when they have reasonable suspicion "that the area swept
harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene," the
Court signaled that type one Buie searches cannot extend beyond the arrest
room.4 13 Moreover, by stating that type one Buie searches cover "spaces
immediately adjoining the place of arrest" such as closets and spaces within
the arrest room, the Court at least implied that these searches are limited to
the arrest room.414
Third, it is clear from Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion that he
understood that the first type of Buie search could never extend beyond the
arrest room. As noted, in his dissent, Justice Brennan challenged the
409Id. at 333.
4 0 Id. at 333-34.
411 See id. at 334.
4121 Id. at 333.
413 See id. at 334.
414See id.
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Court's creation of the first type of Buie search by deeming relatively
"[im]plausible the majority's assumption today that arrestees are likely to
sprinkle hidden allies throughout the rooms in which they might be
arrested."415 This criticism only makes sense if Justice Brennan thought
that type one Buie searches could never extend beyond the arrest room.
C. Raising Arizona: Arizona v. Gant Compels the Conclusion that
Suspicionless Buie Searches Incident to'Lawful Arrests Are
Unconstitutional
The above analysis only remains relevant, however, if the first type of
Buie search is still authorized after Arizona v. Gant. This section argues
that it is not. There were three parts to Arizona v. Gant. First, the Court
laid the Belton fiction to rest and reaffirmed that Chimel v. California
generally "continues to define the boundaries of the [search incident to a
lawful arrest] exception."4 16 Second, the Court adopted Justice Scalia's
Thornton concurrence and gave Harris and Rabinowitz renewed vitality
based upon "circumstances unique to the automobile context... .'A17
Third, the Court rejected the government's argument that "Belton searches
are reasonable regardless of the possibility of access in a given case because
that expansive rule correctly balances law enforcement interests, including
the interest in a bright-line rule, with an arrestee's limited privacy interest in
his vehicle."4 1 8  Together, these conclusions similarly establish the
invalidity of the first type of Buie search.
1. Suspicionless Buie Searches Cannot Be Defended Under
Chimel
As noted, in Chimel v. California, the Court laid out the twin rationales
undergirding searches incident to lawful arrests-protecting officer safety
and preventing the concealment or destruction of evidence-and found that
that they defined the proper scope of such searches: "the arrestee's person
and the area 'within his immediate control'-construing that phrase to
mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or
4 15 Id. at 342 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
4 16 ArZona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1716 (2009).
4 171Id. at 1719.
418Id. at 1720.
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destructible evidence."419 These rationales also defined its boundaries as
they provided "no comparable justification ... for routinely searching any
room other than that in which an arrest occurs-or, for that matter, for
searching through all the desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in
that room itself."4 2 0 In other words, Chimel deemed unconstitutional not
only searches incident to lawful arrests that extend beyond the room of
arrest but also searches beyond the reach of the arrestee within the arrest
room.4 21 According to the Court, "[t]he only reasoned distinction is one
between a search of the person arrested and the area within his reach on the
one hand, and more extensive searches on the other."422
Clearly, because Gant held that Chimel "continues to define the
boundaries of the [search incident to a lawful arrest] exception,"423 courts
can no longer approve type one Buie searches that extend beyond the arrest
room, and thus beyond the area within the arrestee's reach, unless, as will
be addressed infra,424 some other justification applies. More importantly,
however, the reaffirmation of Chimel as defining the boundaries of proper
searches incident to lawful arrests means that type one Buie searches have
been rendered obsolete in the absence of an alternate justification. As
noted, on the one hand, under Chimel, courts cannot defend any type one
Buie searches of spaces that are beyond the immediate control of an
arrestee.4 25 On the other hand, assuming that there is a space in the arrest
room and within the immediate control of the arrestee from which an attack
could be immediately launched, that space would necessarily also be a
space from which the arrestee might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence, meaning that Chimel would authorize the search and
Buie would be unnecessary.42 6
419395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
420id.
421 d
422Id. at 766.
423 See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1716.
424 See infra notes 440-93 and accompanying text.
425 See supra note 422 and accompanying text.
426 Clearly, a space in which a person might be hiding would also be large enough to conceal a
weapon or other evidentiary item.
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2. Harris and Rabinowitz Now Only Apply to Automobile
Arrests
Notwithstanding the Court's conclusion in Gant that Chimel generally
"continues to define the boundaries of the [search incident to a lawful
arrest] exception," the Court immediately thereafter relied upon Justice
Scalia's Harris and Rabinowitz-reviving concurrence in Thornton to
"conclude that circumstances unique to the vehicle context justify a search
incident to a lawful arrest when it is 'reasonable to believe evidence
relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle."' 4 2 7 As Justice
Scalia noted in his Thornton concurrence, what makes the motor vehicle
context unique is that automobiles are "a category of 'effects' which give
rise to a reduced expectation of privacy and heightened law enforcement
needs." 4 28 In other words, "the individual's reduced expectation of privacy
in an automobile, owing to its pervasive regulation"429 justifies this type of
warrantless automobile search incident to a lawful arrest in the same way
that it justifies the automobile exception.
Of course, a person does not have a reduced expectation of privacy in
his home, meaning that this justification could not support a type one Buie
search; instead, an individual's "expectation of privacy is at its highest" in
his home.4 30 Indeed, Gant reaffirmed Chimel, which declared that Harris
and Rabinowitz no longer laid the boundaries of proper searches incident to
lawful home arrests, and the Court made clear that it was only reviving
these latter two opinions for automobile searches incident to lawful arrests
based upon the uniqueness of the motor vehicle context. 4 3 1 Therefore, there
is no logical or precedential ground for arguing that type one Buie searches
can be justified under Harris and Rabinowitz.
3. Suspicionless Buie Searches Are Not Necessary to Protect Law
Enforcement Safety and Evidentiary Interests
If type one Buie searches continue to be constitutionally valid, their
justification can then only lie in a rationale rejected by the Court in Gant:
427Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1716, 1719.
428Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 631 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)
(citations omitted).
429 Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996).
430 Polk v. District of Columbia, 121 F. Supp. 2d 56, 66 (D.D.C. 2000) (construing Wilson v.
Layne, 526 U.S. 604, 610-12 (1999)).
431See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1716; Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766-68 (1969).
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that the first type of Buie search is necessary "to protect law enforcement
safety and evidentiary interests."432 In Gant, the Court found these interests
insufficient to uphold the Belton fiction because it gave "police the power
to conduct ... a search whenever an individual is caught committing a
traffic offense, when there is no basis for believing evidence of the offense
might be found in the vehicle, creat[ing] a serious and recurring threat to the
privacy of countless individuals." 3 3 Accordingly, law enforcement safety
and evidentiary interests can only be sufficient to support type one Buie
searches if the analysis is significantly different in the home arrest context.
There are three relevant points of comparison between the two contexts: the
arrestee's expectation of privacy, the law enforcement safety and
evidentiary interests, and the extent to which established search warrant
exceptions ensure that officers may search when safety or evidentiary
concerns demand.43 4
a. An Individual's Expectation ofPrivacy Is at Its Highest in
His Home
First, as previously noted, individuals have a "reduced expectation of
privacy in an automobile, owing to its pervasive regulation." 4 35 Conversely
an individual's "expectation of privacy is at its highest" in his home,
leading to the obvious conclusion that "the interior of an automobile is not
subject to the same expectations of privacy that exist with respect to one's
home . ... 436 This is not only "because the expectation of privacy with
respect to one's automobile is significantly less than that relating to one's
home or office," but also because of the mobility of automobiles.4 37 These
differences explain why less rigorous warrant requirements govern
automobile searches.4 38 Indeed, the Court in Gant recognized "that a
motorist's privacy interest in his vehicle is less substantial than in his
home . . . . 439 Therefore, this factor weighs strongly against type one Buie
searches being defensible while the Belton fiction was not.
432 Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1721.
4331Id. at 1720.
434Id. at 1720-21.
435Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996).
436New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114 (1986).
437 South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976).
438 See id.
439Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1720.
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b. Law Enforcement Interests During Automobile and Home
Arrests Are Not Meaningfully Different
The Supreme Court has stated the law enforcement safety and
evidentiary interests implicated by arrests of the occupants of automobiles
on several occasions.440 These interests are those of arresting officers in
searching the passenger compartment of an arrestee's automobile to ensure
that the arrestee does not access that compartment to conceal or destroy
evidence or remove a weapon to resist arrest or effect his escape.44 1 In his
Thornton concurrence, Justice Scalia called these interests into question in
cases in which arresting officers had already handcuffed and secured
arrestees in the back of squad cars, noting that the government could cite no
examples in which an arrestee had escaped and retrieved a weapon or
evidence from his vehicle "despite being handcuffed and secured in the
back of a squad car .. .. Scalia further noted the absence of a high risk:
[T]he Government need not document specific instances in
order to justify measures that avoid obvious risks. But the
risk here is far from obvious, and in a context as frequently
recurring as roadside arrests, the Government's inability to
come up with even a single example of a handcuffed
arrestee's retrieval of arms or evidence from his vehicle
undermines its claims. The risk that a suspect handcuffed
in the back of a squad car might escape and recover a
weapon from his vehicle is surely no greater than the risk
that a suspect handcuffed in his residence might escape and
recover a weapon from the next room-a danger we held
insufficient to justify a search in Chimel.443
While Scalia's reasoning did not carry the day in Thornton, the Court
adopted it in Gant to dismantle the Belton fiction. 444 Because individuals
have a significantly higher expectation of privacy in their homes than they
enjoy in their vehicles, the law enforcement safety and evidentiary interests
would need to be significantly higher in the home arrest context for type
noSee supra notes 177-81 and accompanying text.
44 See supra notes 177-81 and accompanying text.
442Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 625-26 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment).
"
3 Id. at 626-27.
4 4See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1718-19.
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one Buie searches to be even potentially defensible.
The first problem in this regard is that the Court mentioned no
evidentiary interests in Buie. Instead, the Court defined the type of search it
was authorizing, the protective sweep, as "a quick and limited search of
premises incident to an arrest and conducted to protect the safety of police
officers or others.""5 And while the Court did not explain the first type of
Buie search in any detail, the fact that this type of search covers spaces
"from which an attack could be immediately launched," makes clear that
such searches are defensible, if at all, solely based upon law enforcement
safety interests and not upon evidentiary interests.446
With regard to the safety interests, the Court itself indicated in Buie that
law enforcement safety interests do not justify suspicionless Buie searches
any more than they justify suspicionless searches during on-the-street or
roadside investigatory encounters.447 It is again important to keep in mind
that the portion of the Court's opinion in Buie creating the protective sweep
was the controlling portion of its opinion while the portion creating the
suspicionless, first type of Buie search was dictum." 8  The footnote
immediately following the Court's two-part holding proves both this point
and that the Court did not view the law enforcement safety interests in the
non-home arrest context and the home arrest context as meaningfully
different." 9
As noted in that footnote, the Court rejected the State's contention that
Detective Frolich's search required "no level of objective justification"
because of "the danger that inheres in the in-home arrest for a violent
crime" and applied Terry's requirement of reasonable suspicion "to the
protective sweep of a house."4 50 The Court did so because "despite the
danger that inheres in on-the-street encounters and the need for police to act
quickly for their own safety, the Court in Terry did not adopt a bright-line
rule authorizing frisks for weapons in all confrontational encounters."4 5 1
Indeed, the Court noted that "[e]ven in high crime areas, where the
possibility that any given individual is armed is significant, Terry requires
"
5 Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990).
"
61d. at 334.
47 Id. at 333.
" See supra notes 209-21 and accompanying text.
"
9 Buie, 494 U.S. at 334 n.2.
450 d.
451 Id.
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reasonable suspicion before a frisk for weapons can be conducted." 45 2
These findings compel the conclusion that the Court did not view the law
enforcement safety interests in the non-home arrest context and the home
arrest context as meaningfully different.
At another point in its Buie opinion, the Court did find that "[t]he risk of
danger in the context of an arrest in the home is as great as, if not greater
than, it is an on-the-street or roadside investigatory encounter." 453 The
above paragraph, however, establishes that this was merely idle speculation,
with any difference in danger being insignificant.454 More importantly, the
Court's speculation in this regard was directed solely at the potential
dangers associated with type two Buie searches, not type one Buie searches.
The reason that the Court found that the risk of danger might be greater in
the context of home arrests was because, "unlike an encounter on the street
or along a highway, an in-home arrest puts the officer at the disadvantage of
being on his adversary's turf," with "[a]n ambush in a confined setting of
unknown configuration .. . more to be feared than it is in open, more
familiar surroundings."455
As noted, in reaching this conclusion, the Court likely relied upon the
argument in the government's brief that "[a]n accomplice, lurking in
another room, might take someone hostage or attack the officers or the
arrestee as they are leaving the premises" 456 and the argument in two
amicus briefs that it would make little sense to allow the police to protect
themselves against known persons but to forbid them from searching for
others who are potentially more dangerous.4 57 These arguments, as well as
the Court's conclusion, indicate that any increased risk of danger during
home arrests is based upon the unknown configuration of the place of arrest
and the possibility of accomplices hiding in other rooms. Because, as
noted, a type one Buie search can never extend beyond the arrest room, 4 58
this "home field advantage" argument has no relevance to this type of
search.
Moreover, even if the Court was not idly speculating about increased
452 d.
4531d. at 333.
454 See supra notes 450-53 and accompanying text.
455Buie, 494 U.S. at 333.
456See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
457 See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
458See supra notes 409-15 and accompanying text.
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risk, and even if this increased risk had relevance to type one Buie searches,
the Court's conclusion in this regard would be subject to the same
challenges that undid the Belton fiction. Gant's destruction of the Belton
fiction was based upon Justice Scalia's Thornton concurrence, which found
that the problem with the Belton fiction was that the government could cite
no examples in which an arrestee had escaped and retrieved a weapon or
evidence from his vehicle "despite being handcuffed and secured in the
back of a squad car. .. .. 459 The same attack could be launched against the
type one Buie search.
In his respondent's brief, Buie argued that "[t]he State ha[d] cited no
statistical or historical evidence that officers inside residences are especially
susceptible to ambush." 4 60 Moreover, Buie cited to a study which collected
data on police in five south central states in the early 1970s:
The assaults were classified according to type: general
(unplanned attacks arising out of heated, emotional
situations with much opportunity for interaction and
communication between officer and assailant before the
attack), robbery-related (attacks developed from sudden
confrontations between police and offender in robbery
situations), and ambush (sudden surprise attacks with no
advance interaction between officer and assailant).4 6'
The assaults were also "classified according to other variables including
the location of assault," and "of 264 assaults in private residences, 259
(98.1%) were general, 2 (0.7%) were robbery-related, and 3 (1.1%) were
ambushes." 4 62 Buie noted that this data did "not show whether any of those
three ambushes was a confederate's surprise attack meant to foil an
arrest."4 63 However, based upon the fact that only 1.1% of the attacks were
ambushes, he was able to conclude "that if a police officer can expect to be
assaulted in a private home, it is not likely to be by the kind of ambush that
459Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 625-26 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment).460Brief for Respondent at 14, Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990) (No. 88-1369), 1989
WL 1127011.461Id. at 14-i5 (construing C. K. Meyer et al., A Comparative Assessment of Assault
Incidents: Robbery-Related, Ambush, and General Police Assaults, 9 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 1,
3 (1981)).
462Id. at 15.
463 d.
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a protective sweep is intended to prevent."464 Instead, Buie claimed that
"[t]here is simply no objective support for a heightened sense of danger in
these situations." 4 65 As support for this last claim, Buie noted that "[a]
second premise on which the State's position depends, that arrests for
violent crimes necessarily carry a greater potential for danger, has already
been rejected by the Court.'4 66
Indeed, the Court in Buie agreed with this argument, finding that "the
existence of [an] arrest warrant implies nothing about whether dangerous
third parties will be found in the arrestee's house."467 The problem for Buie
was that the Court reached this conclusion as part of its holding that a
protective sweep can be justified, not solely based upon a lawful arrest, but
based upon reasonable suspicion of danger in addition to a lawful arrest. 468
However, the problem for the government should a defendant or appellant
challenge a type one Buie search after Gant is that, in the words of Justice
Scalia, the above language from Buie indicates that the risk of arresting
officers being attacked by confederates during home arrests is "far from
obvious."4 69
Therefore, just as "the Government's inability to come up with even a
single example of a handcuffed arrestee's retrieval of arms or evidence
from his vehicle" 4 70 proved fatal for the Belton fiction, the government's
inability (so far) to come up with even a single example of a confederate
attacking an arresting officer from a space immediately adjoining the place
of arrest4 7 1 should prove fatal to the first type of Buie search. In fact, to
defend type one Buie searches, the government would need to come up with
(at the very least) an example of a confederate attacking an arresting officer
from a space immediately adjoining the place of arrest when the officer
lacked even reasonable suspicion of such an attack, because the existing
search warrant exception for protective sweeps authorizes a search for such
confederates when there is reasonable suspicion.4 72 This leads into the final
point of comparison between the automobile and home arrest contexts.
464 Id.
45Id.
4661Id at 15 n.6.
467 Buie, 494 U.S. at 334 n.2.
468 d.
469 Thomton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 626 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
470 id.
47 1 See supra notes 460-64 and accompanying text.
472Buie, 494 U.S. at 334.
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c. Established Exceptions Authorize Home Searches when
Safety or Evidentiary Concerns Demand
In Gant, the Court found that a broad reading of Belton was unnecessary
to protect law enforcement safety and evidentiary interests because two
established exceptions to the search warrant requirement "authorize a
vehicle search under additional circumstances when safety or evidentiary
concerns demand."473 The first exception was the automobile exception,
and the second exception was the Michigan v. Long automobile frisk.474
The Court also included a cf citation to the Buie protective sweep as
support for the proposition that "there may be still other circumstances in
which safety or evidentiary interests would justify a search."47 5
As the cf citation makes clear, Buie does not apply to automobile
searches, but the Buie protective sweep is one example of an established
exception to the search warrant requirement for home arrests that renders
type one Buie searches unnecessary to protect law enforcement safety
interests. As previously noted, the Buie protective sweep is the home
counterpart to the Michigan v. Long protective sweep of an automobile.47 6
In Gant, the Court held that "Michigan v. Long permits an officer to search
a vehicle's passenger compartment when he has reasonable suspicion that
an individual, whether or not the arrestee, is 'dangerous' and might access
the vehicle to 'gain immediate control of weapons."' 4 77 Meanwhile, under
the Buie protective sweep, arresting officers can search areas which they
reasonably believe harbor individuals posing a danger to those on the arrest
scene. 4 78 Also, of course, Chimel still automatically authorizes arresting
officers to search the area from within which arrestees might gain
possession of weapons or destructible evidence.479
Together, these existing exceptions authorize home searches under
additional circumstances when law enforcement safety and evidentiary
interests demand at least to the same extent as Michigan v. Long authorizes
automobile searches. Moreover, an additional exception provides more
protection in the home arrest context. As noted, many courts have extended
473 Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1721 (2009).
474 d.
475 d.
476See supra notes 202-08 and accompanying text.
4 77 Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1721 (citation omitted).
478 See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990).
479 See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1969).
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the reasoning of Michigan v. Summers to find that an arrest warrant per se
carries with it the limited authority for officers to detain the occupants of
the premises while a proper arrest is conducted.480 Combined with Chimel
and the protective sweep portion of Buie, this means that, even without the
type one Buie search, officers conducting a home arrest could still detain
arrestees and search the area within their immediate control, automatically
detain any other occupants, and search for other occupants if they have
reasonable suspicion that they are present and pose a danger to those on the
arrest scene. Without the type one Buie search, arresting officers simply
could not search for other occupants without reasonable suspicion.
Arresting officers cannot so protect themselves during automobile
arrests. Of course, officers conducting an automobile arrest can detain
arrestees and search the area within their immediate control, as well as the
passenger compartment, when they have reasonable suspicion that an
individual, whether or not the arrestee, is dangerous and might access the
vehicle to gain immediate control of weapons. 481  But arresting officers
have no analogous authority to detain other occupants of the automobile or
bystanders without reasonable suspicion. Extending the analysis from the
aforementioned Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 4 8 2 the Court in Maryland v. Wilson
found that "an officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to get out
of the car pending completion of the stop." 4 83 But the Court in Wilson also
"express[ed] no opinion upon" the issue of whether an officer may forcibly
detain a passenger for the entire duration of the stop.4 84 Since Wilson, only
a few courts have authorized such detentions.485 Conversely, even after
Wilson, most courts have found that their state constitutions forbid arresting
officers from even ordering non-arrestee passengers out of vehicles.4 86
What this means is that, in the context of automobile arrests completed
without reasonable suspicion of danger, no courts hold that arresting
officers can detain bystanders; only a few courts hold that arresting officers
can detain non-arrestee passengers, and a few (more) courts hold that
480See supra note 294 and accompanying text.
4 81 See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719.
482434 U.S. 106, 111 n.6 (1977).
483519 U.S. 408, 415 (1997).
484Id. at 415 n.3.
48 See, e.g., Williams v. Commonwealth, No. 1827-00-3, 2001 WL 826525, at *2 (Va. Ct.
App. July 24, 2001) (noting that police officers can detain passengers until the completion of a
traffic stop).
486See, e.g., State v. Sprague, 824 A.2d 539, 544 (Vt. 2003) (citing cases from several states).
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arresting officers cannot even order non-arrestee occupants out of vehicles.
This also means that officers completing an automobile arrest could be
subject to unpreventable danger that is preventable during a home arrest.
As Justice Alito noted in his dissent in Gant, the Court was insouciant to
two situations where neither existing exceptions nor the Court's
construction of Belton would authorize a vehicle search despite safety
concerns so demanding:
First, it is not uncommon for an officer to arrest some but
not all of the occupants of a vehicle.. . . Second, there may
be situations in which an arresting officer has cause to fear
that persons who were not passengers in the car might
attempt to retrieve a weapon or evidence from the car while
the officer is still on the scene.487
For instance, in Gant, if Gant had a passenger, and the arresting officers
did not have reasonable suspicion that the passenger was dangerous, they
could not have detained him while they arrested Gant. Moreover, while the
officers in Gant did arrest a man and a woman outside the house in front of
which Gant was arrested, if the officers did not have probable cause to
arrest them or reasonable suspicion that they were dangerous, they could
not have detained them while they arrested Gant. Conversely, if the officers
arrested Gant in the house and came across any of these people inside the
house before arresting Gant, they could have detained them under the way
that many courts have interpreted Michigan v. Summers, even in the
absence of a type one Buie search.
The second existing exception mentioned by the Court in Gant was the
automobile exception, which holds that "[i]f there is probable cause to
believe that a vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity," officers can
search "any area of the vehicle in which evidence might be found."ASS Of
course, the counterpart in the home arrest context is the search warrant.
Indeed, while it was short lived, the Supreme Court's opinion in Trupiano
v. United States briefly held that arresting officers could not conduct a
search incident to a lawful home arrest if it was practicable for those
officers to procure a search warrant before completing the arrest. 48 9 While
487Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1731 n.2 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting).
4881 Id. at 1721 (majority opinion).
489334 U.S. 699, 708 (1948), overruled in part by United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56
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the Court's opinion in Rabinowitz largely discredited Trupiano, its
subsequent opinion in Chimel revitalized Trupiano in spirit, if not in
holding.4 90
The Court in Chimel repudiated Rabinowitz for a few reasons. One
reason was that "the approach taken in cases such as Go-Bart, Le/kowitz,
and Trupiano was essentially disregarded by the Rabinowitz Court.'491
Another reason was that Rabinowitz (and Harris) "g[a]ve law enforcement
officials the opportunity to engage in searches not justified by probable
cause, by the simple expedient of arranging to arrest suspects at home rather
than elsewhere."492 Type one Buie searches give law enforcement officials
the opportunity to engage in home searches not justified by probable cause
or even reasonable suspicion, and they do so when officers could, as noted
in Chimel, simply arrest suspects at some other location if they believe that
a home arrest might be dangerous.493 Therefore, the existing (search)
warrant exceptions in the home arrest context, like the arrestee's
expectation of privacy and the law enforcement evidentiary and safety
interests, do not provide a basis for saving the type one Buie search from
the fate that befell the Belton fiction.
V. CONCLUSION
In United States v. Rabinowitz, Justice Frankfurter dissented from the
majority's opinion and its expansive reading of the search incident to a
lawful arrest exception, concluding that the decisions supporting that
opinion "merely prove[d] how a hint becomes a suggestion, is loosely
turned into dictum and finally elevated into a decision."A94 His words
finally commanded a majority of the Court in its landmark decision in
Chimel v. California. Nevertheless, despite Chimel's limiting twin
rationales, the Court soon found itself creating what would become the
Belton fiction and then piling fiction upon (Belton) fiction in Thornton, with
the only difference between Rabinowitz and Belton being that, with the
latter opinion, a dissent and not dictum was elevated into a decision. By
reaffirming Chimel as defining the proper boundaries of searches incident to
(1950).
490 See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).
491 Id. at 760.
492 Id. at 767.
493 d.
494 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 75 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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lawful arrests, the Court in Gant erased the Belton fiction and repudiated
Thornton as an extension of Chimel.
While not mentioned in Gant, the first type of Buie search is actually a
more perfect example of the problem identified by Justice Frankfurter. In
an opinion single-mindedly focused on establishing the validity of
protective sweeps supported by reasonable suspicion, the Court in Buie
inserted a single line that suggested in dictum that arresting officers might
be able to search spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest without
the requirement of probable cause or reasonable suspicion.495 From this
dictum, courts have stretched the scope of these suspicionless searches
down hallways, into separate rooms, and even into every room of small
apartments and houses. These opinions clearly stretched the scope of type
one Buie searches beyond the breaking point, meaning that courts should
have concluded even before Gant that they grossly misconstrued the scope
of the first type of Buie search. After Gant, this conclusion still holds, but
courts should also use the same reasoning used to dismantle the Belton
fiction to put to rest suspicionless Buie searches.
495See 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990).
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